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CASH RULES EVERYTHING AROUND THE 
MONEY BAIL SYSTEM: THE EFFECT OF CASH-
ONLY BAIL ON INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN 
AMERICA'S MONEY BAIL SYSTEM 
NICHOLAS P. JOHNSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
For Father's day 2017, songwriter and recording artist 
Shawn Carter, better known as "Jay-Z," decided to "take on the 
exploitative bail industry," writing an essay that discussed the 
injustices surrounding bail and America's criminal justice system.1 
After helping produce a docuseries titled "Time: The Kalief Brower 
Story," Carter became enthralled in the matter. He discussed the 
issues surrounding America's criminal justice system and the bail 
industry, including bail's enormously high costs, the expense of 
private attorneys' fees, the bail system's adverse impact on the 
indigent and their families, and, perhaps most importantly, the 
complete reversal of notion of being innocent until proven guilty-
*Assistant Clinical Professor and Director of the Community Economic Develop-
ment Clinic at Thomas Jefferson School of Law. I am grateful for the supportive 
feedback from my law school faculty colleagues: Associate Dean Susan Bisom-
Rapp, Professor Steve Berenson, and Professor Ellen Waldman. I am also thankful 
to Professor Luz Herrera, Dean Linda Morton, and attorney Jay Sacks. I special 
thank you to the research assistance from Thomas Jefferson School of Law student 
Luiza Vannucci Dias. A heartfelt thank you to my amazing husband for his never 
failing support 
1 Shawn Carter, Jay-Z: For Father'sDay, I'm Taking on the Exploitative Bail 
Industry,TIME (June 16, 2017), http://time.com/4821547/jay-z-racism-bail-bonds/; 
see also Travis M. Andrews, For Father'sDay, Jay-Z Pens Oped about a 
PredatoryBail System That SeparatesFamilies, WASH. POST (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/06/19/for-fathers-
day-jay-z-pens-op-ed-about-a-predatory-bail-system-that-separates-families/. 
2 Carter, supranote 1. 
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or as Carter calls it, being "Guilty Until Proven Innocent.",3 Kalief 
Brower's story exemplifies the injustice Carter has now worked so 
hard to remedy. Browder, at sixteen-year-old, was accused of steal-
ing a backpack and arrested on the spot.4 Browder's family's 
inability to post bail lead to Browder spending the next three years 
incarcerated at Rikers Island without a trial, two of which were 
spent in solitary confinement.5 Browder attempted suicide several 
times while awaiting a trial that would never come.6 Finally, after 
being released once the charges against him were dropped, Browder 
took his own life.7 
Throughout the United States, there are approximately 1.6 
million people imprisoned in state or federal detention centers, and 
of these inmates, roughly 450,000 of them are detained in local jails 
awaiting trial. 8 This is due in large part to America's money bail 
system, which disproportionately impacts poor Americans while 
serving as a mere inconvenience for those with a disposable 
income. 9 Research shows that of the pretrial detainees unable to post 
bail, 60% fall within the poorest one-third of Americans and 80% 
fall within the bottom one-half of the poverty scale. 10 One study 
conducted on New York City residents found that even when bail 
was set at or below $500, many of the City's residents accused of 
crimes still could not afford bail." This is particularly troublesome 
considering that the vast majority of individuals unable to post cash 
3Id. ("Millions of people are separated from their families for months at a time-
not because they are convicted of committing a crime, but because they are 
accused of committing a crime."); see also JAY-Z, GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNO-
CENT (Roc-A-Fella Records 2000). 
' Jennifer Gonnerman, KaliefBrowder, 1993 2015, NEW YORKER (June 7, 2015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015.5 id. 
6id. 
7Id. 
8 See Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Detaining the Poor (Prison Policy 
Initiative 2016). 
9See Melissa Neil, Bail Fail: Why the U.S. Should End the Practiceof Using 
Money for Bail, 13 JUSTICE POLICY INST. (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/ 
uploads/justicepolicy/documents/bailfail.pdf. 
10 See Rabuy, supranote 8, at 1n.9. 
1See id. 
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bail are not dangerous, as they are often arrested for low-level, 
nonviolent offenses. 12 Moreover, recent statistics have shown that 
while overall crime rates in America are decreasing, our jail 
populations are actually increasing. 13 
Pretrial detention has detrimental effects on those unable to 
post bail, including job loss, family breakdown, the inability to 
prepare an adequate criminal defense, and a greater likelihood of 
being convicted. 14 Further, pretrial incarceration affects more people 
than just the poor, as it places enormous financial burdens on tax-
payers.1 5 In 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder indicated that 
pretrial detention costs taxpayers roughly nine billion dollars. 
16 
Also, while the United States Constitution prohibits the government 
from imposing excessive bail, 17 twentieth century bail reform has 
given judges significant pretrial discretion in setting bail.18 This 
discretion has led to judges requiring defendants to post high, but 
not necessarily "excessive" bail amounts. 19 A recent adaptation of 
this judicial discretion is cash-only bail, in which judges require 
defendants to post their entire bail amount in cash to the court in 
order to obtain pretrial release.2 ° 
12 See Laura Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: PretrialDetention, Punish-
ment, & The Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 1297, 1311 (2012). 
13 See Timothy R. Schnacke et al., The History of Bail and PretrialRelease, 
PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST. 1, 21 (2010); see also Aimee Picchi, The High Price of 
Incarceration in America, CBSNEws.coM May 8, 2014, http://www.cbsnews. 
com/news/the-high-price-of-americas-incarceration-80-billion/ (indicating that the 
overall rates for violent and property crimes have decreased by 45% the last 
twenty years).
14 See id. 
15 See Samuel R. Wiseman, PretrialDetentionandthe Right to Be Monitored, 123 
YALEL.J. 1344, 1356 (2014). 
16 See Eric H. Holder Jr., Att'y Gen., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, National Symposium 
on Pretrial Justice (June 1, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attomey-
general-eric-holder-speaks-national-symposium-pretrial-justice;see also Picchi, 
supra note 13 (noting that America's overall corrections budget is $80 billion 
dollars).SU.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required."). 
18 See infra Sections I.C.3-4. 
19 See infra Section I.C. 
20 See infra Section II.C. 
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Despite most state constitutions mandating that all persons21 
charged with noncapital crimes be "bailable by sufficient sureties, 
also known as the Consensus Right to Bail,22 courts are currently 
divided on whether cash-only bail 23 is constitutional. 24 A recent 
Fifth Circuit decision took the issue head on, ruling cash-only bail 
unconstitutional.25 The Fifth Circuit held that individuals have "a 
state-created liberty interest" in being bailable by sufficient sureties, 
and thus, may not be deprived of due process or equal protection 
21 See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 4-5. 
22 See infra Section II.B. 
23 The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals in Williams v. City of Montgomery, 739 
So. 2d 515, 517 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), defined "cash bail" as "where cash in an 
amount equal to, or part of, the total sum of bail is paid into court." Cash-only bail 
within the context of this Note refers to the practice of judges setting a specified 
amount of bail and requiring the full amount be paid in full for the accused to 
obtain pretrial release. See State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 346 n.1(Minn. 2000) 
(en banc).
24 CompareBrooks, 604 N.W.2d at 354 (ruling cash-only bail as unconstitutional), 
and State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 55 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (ruling cash-only bail 
as unconstitutional), with State v. Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106, 1111 (N.M.2006) 
(ruling cash-only bail as constitutional), and Saunders v. Homecker, 344 P.3d 771, 
780-81 (Wyo. 2015) (ruling cash-only bail as constitutional); see also infra 
Sections 11.C. 1-2. 
25 See O'Donnell v. Harris Cty., 2018 WL 851776, at *5-7 (Feb. 14, 2018) 
("[S]tate law forbids the setting of bail as an instrument of oppression. Thus, 
magistrates may not impose a secured bail solely for the purpose of detaining the 
accused for the purpose of detaining the accused. And, when the accused is indi-
gent, setting a secured bail will, in most cases, have the same effect as a detention 
order." Accordingly, such decisions must reflect a careful weighing of the indivi-
dualized factors.") (internal marks omitted). The bail system in Harris County 
used a fixed fee schedule-a set bail amount-that, in practice, did not stray from 
the fee schedule. See Debra Cassens Weiss, 5th CircuitSays Cash BailSystem in 
Texas County Is Unconstitutional,ABA J. (Feb. 15, 2018, 1:38PM), http://www. 
abajoumal.com/news/article/5th circuit sayscash bail system in texas county 
is unconstitutional (discussing O'Donnell, 2018 WL 851776). The system, 
instead, should have considered individual factors, such as the defendant's ability 
to pay, dangerous propensities, severity of the crime, etc. Id. Nonetheless, the 
procedures in place were held inadequate, as the court in O'Donnellheld that "bail 
decision[s] must be made based on individualized factors that weigh the detainee's 
interest in pretrial release and the court's interest in securing the detainee's 
appearance." See id. 
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under the law.26 Notably however, there is no universal rule to 
follow when analyzing a defendant's constitutional challenge to 
cash-only bail; instead, courts utilize theories of statutory interpreta-
tion to address the meaning and scope of the "sufficient sureties" 
language.27 Incidentally, the courts that focus on bail's history or the 
intent of the framers are overlooking the bigger picture-cash-only 
bail's effect on the indigent.28 
It is readily apparent that cash-only bail disproportionately 
affects those of a low socioeconomic status. 29 Setting cash-only bail 
for low-income defendants who ultimately cannot afford it punishes 
these individuals by way of pretrial detention. 30 This detention runs
counter to a core principle of America's criminal justice system-
26 See O'Donnell, 2018 WL 851776, at *5-7. While the court's focus in 
0 'Donnellwas the cash bail system in Harris County violating due process and 
equal protection, those claims are not the subject of this Comment. 
27 See Saunders, 344 P.3d at 778 ("[I]n interpreting the plain and unambiguous 
language of the Constitution, we follow harmonizing rules similar to those 
employed when interpreting statutes."); see also Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 348 
("Resolution of the cash only bail issue turns on interpretation of... the phrase
'sufficient sureties."'); O'Donnell,2018 WL 851776, at *6 ("On the one hand, bail 
is meant to secure the presence of the defendant in court at his trial... [, and o]n 
the other hand, Texas courts have repeatedly emphasized the important of bail as a 
means of protecting an accused detainee's constitutional right in remaining free 
before trial.") (internal citations omitted).
28 See infra Part III; see also O'Donnell,2018 WL 851776, at *3, *8 (holding that 
the Texas County bail system that failed to consider a defendant's personal 
circumstances-including indigence and ability to pay-in the bail and pretrial 
release decisions was unconstitutional).29 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 16 
(2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/docu 
ments/CEA%/o2BCriminal%/2BJustice%/2BReport.pdf ("[B]ecause bail is typically 
assigned without consideration for an individual's resources, financial bail policies 
often result in detaining the poorest rather than the most dangerous offenders."); 
see also Neil, supra note 9, at 13-15 (noting the effect cash bail has on the 
indigent). 
30 See Appleman, supranote 12, at 1304 (indicating that pretrial detention "contra-
dicts the requirements of even our minimal pretrial protection for defendants, 
which holds that punishment can only occur after a conviction'). 
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the presumption of innocence. 31 Thus, judges should refrain from 
setting cash-only bail and consider its alternatives, including recog-
nizance bonds32 and electronic monitoring,33 to alleviate the burdens 
the money bail system imposes on indigent criminal defendants.34 
While cash-only bail is an effective means of ensuring arrestees' 
presence at trial and community safety,35 electronic monitoring36 
and recognizance bonds37 provide courts with adequate alternatives 
in lieu of cash-only bail.38 
Part I of this Note provides a general overview of the money 
bail system and discusses the history of bail beginning in England 
and through the adoption of bail in the United States,39 including the 
Federal Bail Reform Acts of 196640 and 198441 and watershed 
3 For an in-depth look into the role the presumption of innocence plays in the bail-
setting process, see Joseph L. Lester, PresumedInnocent, FearedDangerous: The 
EighthAmendment's Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REv. 1, 1-63 (2005) (discussing 
the importance of the presumption of innocence and bail during the pretrial 
process of a criminal prosecution). In the context of this Note, the phrase "pre-
sumption of innocence" will be used primarily to refer to the government's 
inability to incarcerate-or punish-a defendant for failure to make a cash-only 
bail. See id. at 7 (referring to the presumption of innocence as "the government 
[being] precluded from exacting punishment" and noting that the presumption 
"afforded to an accused is a safety precaution to assure that only the guilty are 
punished"). 
32 See Lydia D. Johnson, The Politics of the Bail System: What's the Pricefor 
Freedom?, 17 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY'S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 171, 199 
(2015) (describing release on one's own recognizance as an alternative to low-risk, 
poor defendants).
33 See Wiseman, supranote 15, 1348-49, 1364-82 (providing electronic monitor-
ing of individuals as a twenty-first century solution to the burdens and inequalities 
the money bail system imposed on the indigent).
31 See State v. Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106, 1111 (N.M. 2006) (cautioning trial court 
judges to only use cash-only bail as a "last option" after careful consideration of 
other alternatives). 
35 See Philip J. Van De Veer, No Bond, No Body, andNo Return ofService: The 
Failureto Honor Misdemeanorand Gross Misdemeanor Warrantsin the State of 
Washington, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 847, 876-77 (2003). 
36 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1348-49, 1364-82. 
37 See Neil, supranote 9, at 31-32. 
38 See infra Section III.C. 
39 See infraPart1. 
40 Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (repealed 1983). 
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United States Supreme Court decisions regarding bail.42 Part II 
examines the factors judges use to set bail, the constitutionality of 
cash-only bail, the states' split on the issue, and competing scholarly 
views on alternatives to money bail.43 Part III analyzes the impact 
cash-only bail has on the indigent and how state courts have ignored 
the bigger picture-cash-only bail's effect on indigent defendants.44 
This Part argues in favor of individualized bail proceedings and 
nonfinancial conditions of pretrial release, concluding that the 
benefits of these solutions outweigh their costs or limitations.45 
I. ADDICTED TO MONEY: THE EVOLUTION 
OF BAIL AND THE CURRENT MONEY BAIL 
SYSTEM 
In its most basic sense, bail today is known as an amount of 
cash or other security that a criminal defendant pays to be released 
before trial.46 Once a defendant is arrested for alleged unlawful 
conduct, the defendant will appear before a magistrate 47 within 
twenty-four hours to be informed of the charges against the defen-
dant and for bail to be set. 48 A judge is given wide discretion in 
determining the type of bail to set or whether bail should be 
41 Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2008). 
42 See infra Sections 1.C. 1-4. 
13 See infraPart II. 
" See infra Sections III.A-B. 
15 See infraPart III. 
46 Bail, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining bail as "[a] security 
such as cash, a bond, or property ... required by a court for the release of a 
criminal defendant who must appear in court at a future time"). 
17 A magistrate is typically "a quasi-judicial officer given the power to set bail, 
accept bond, [or] accept guilty pleas." District-CourtMagistrate, BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A magistrate is usually a judicial officer with limited 
jurisdiction and authority as compared to a judge. Magistrate,BLACK'S LAW DiC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This Note will use magistrate and judge interchangeably 
as ajudicial officer who sets bail. 
48 See Paul Bernard Wice, Bail and Its Reform: A National Survey 12 U.S. Dep't. 
of Justice (1973); see also Van De Veer, supranote 35, at 849. 
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Vols. 36-37 
denied. 49 However, the presumption of innocence, which protects 
the accused from punishment and incarceration before conviction, 
provides a counter balance to the judge's discretion and mandates 
that pretrial release be the rule and pretrial detention be the excep-
5 51tion.50 This presumption is fundamental in the bail-setting process. 
Despite pretrial release being the norm, two competing 
objectives of bail have led to many criminally accused individuals 
sitting in jail rather than out on bail.52 In addition to preserving the 
accused's presumption of innocence,53 the second and more notable 
objective of bail is that courts set bail to ensure the accused's 
appearance at trial.54 These purposes date as far back as the Statute 
of Westminster 55 in Anglo-Saxon England, through Colonial 
America and are still very much alive in the criminal justice system 
today.56 
'9See Wice, supra note 48, at 11; see also Barbara Gottlieb, NAT'L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, Public Danger as a Factorin PretrialRelease: A ComparativeAnalysis 
of State Laws 65 (1984) ("Statutes often list factors that judicial officers should 
take into consideration in establishing conditions of release, but the weight to be 
given to information concerning potentially relevant factors is within the judicial 
officer's discretion."). 
50 See Appleman, supranote 12, at 1331 (explaining that the Bail Reform Act of 
1984 reaffirmed pretrial release as the norm).
51 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1,7-8 (1959) (Jackson, J.,concurring) ("[B]ail... 
is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found 
convenient to give them a trial. On the contrary, the spirit of the procedure is to 
enable them to stay out of jail until a trial has found them guilty.").
52 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1403-04 ("[T]housands of criminal defendants 
around the country are imprisoned to ensure their presence at trial despite being 
eligible for release.").
53See, e.g., State v. Barton, 331 P. 3d 50, 55 (Wash. 2014) (en banc); State v. 
Hance, 910 A.2d 874, 879 (Vt. 2006). 
51 See, e.g., Tmjillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Ark. 2016); Saunders v. 
Hornecker, 344 P.3d 771, 781 (Wyo. 2015); State v. Jackson, 384 S.W.3d 208, 
216 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); State v. Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106 (N.M.2006). 
55 Statute of Westminster, 1275 § 3 Edw. 1c. 15 (Eng.). 
56 See June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor'sNew Clothes: Rediscovery of 
Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REv. 517, 517 
(1983). 
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A. Money in the Bank: Common Forms of Bail 
If a judge decides the accused's risk of pretrial flight or 
danger to the community is low, then that judge may impose certain 
forms or conditions of pretrial release to ensure the accused's 
presence at trial.57 The most frequent form of bail that judges 
impose is cash bail. 58 For cash bail, a judge sets a fixed amount of 
money and the accused either pays the court the full amount of the 
bond or pays 10% of the bail amount to the court or bail bonds-
man. 59 If the defendant deposits 10% of the bond amount to the 
court directly and does not miss a court appearance, 90% of the 
defendant's 10% deposit is returned to the defendant.6 ° In addition 
to cash bonds, judges may impose pretrial release conditions as a 
form of bail, in which defendants' pretrial release is subject to their 
compliance with drug tests, pretrial services, and other community-
supervision requirements. 61 There is also the least restrictive form of 
bail known as a recognizance bond, or a release on one's own 
recognizance. 62 A recognizance bond allows defendants to be 
57 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 9 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The ques-
tion when application for bail is made relates to each one's trustworthiness to 
appear for trial and what security will supply reasonable assurance of his appear-
ance.").
58 See Wice, supra note 48, at 10. The court may also release defendants on 
property bonds, in which property is offered as collateral in lieu of money. See id. 
at 11. Courts rarely use property bonds, however, because such bonds raise ethical 
dilemmas if the defendant fails to appear. See id. 
59 See id. at 10. Because this Note focuses on a trial court's imposition of cash-
only bail and the alternatives to that particular method of bail, the use of commer-
cial bail bondsmen will not be discussed in depth. It is worth noting, however, that 
because "[c]ommercial bondsmen rarely lend bail money of $1,000 or less, their 
services are usually too expensive for low-income or indigent offenders." See 
Appleman, supra note 12, 1306. Thus, commercial bail bondsmen do not repre-
sent an adequate alternative for low-income defendants. See id. 
60 See Wice, supra note 48, at 10 (discussing the differences between defendants 
paying the court 10% of the bond amount versus paying commercial bail bonds-
men 10% of the bail amount, in which the defendant will not recover any of his 
10% payment).
61 See id.Neil, supranote 9, at 7; see also Wice, supranote 48, at 11. 
62 See Wice, supranote 48, at 11-12. 
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released pretrial without posting a security or complying with any 
court-ordered conditions.63 While a recognizance bond may seem 
like the least trustworthy device to ensure defendants' appearance at 
trial, bail reform projects suggest that recognizance bonds are an 
effective tool in ensuring defendants' attendance at trial .64 
B. Paper Trail: The Origins of Bail from Anglo-
Saxon England to Colonial America 
In the late Anglo-Saxon era, England created the concept of 
bail out of concern that people who were sued in private grievances 
would flee to avoid paying money to their injured victims. 6 5 During 
the Norman Conquest 66 in the eleventh century, however, the state 
began to govern private disputes, imposing capital and corporal 
punishment instead of monetary fines as a sentence.67 This alteration 
of punishment during the Norman Conquest gave criminal defen-
dants more incentive to flee out of fear of physical harm, which lead 
to judges using bail as a means of incarcerating criminal defendants 
to ensure their presence at trial.68 In response, Parliament passed the 
Statute of Westminster,69 which differentiated between bailable and 
nonbailable offenses. 70 The Statute protected the accused from 
63 See Neil, supranote 9, at 7 (noting that recognizance bonds only require defen-
dants to provide a signature agreeing to appear for future court dates). Pretrial 
defendants may also be released on an unsecured bond, in which the accused signs 
a contract agreeing to appear in court and accepting liability for a set bond amount 
if the accused fails to appear. See id. 
64 See infra Section I.C.2. 
65 See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 1-2. In order to ensure that compensation 
would be paid, the cost of pretrial release was identical to the amount payable to 
the injured party. See Carbone, supra note 56, at 519-20, describing this bail 
system as "perhaps the last entirely rational application of bail," as its purpose was 
to ensure the victim or victim's family was properly compensated for their loss. 
66 Norman Conquest, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at https://www. 
britannica.com/event/Norman-Conquest (last visited April 30, 2018).
67 See Carbone, supranote 56, at 520-21. 
68 See id.at 522. 
69 Statute of Westminster 1275, 3Edw. 1 c. 15 (Eng.). 
71 Statute of Westminster 1275, 3 Edw. 1 c. 15 (Eng.); see also Matthew Hegre-
ness, America's Fundamentaland VanishingRight to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. REv. 909, 
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judges' abusive bail practices while providing both consistency and 
certainty in bail administration.71 Ultimately, other than capital 
offenses, which were not bailable, bail was considered a right.7 
After many centuries of governance in the bail-setting pro-
cess, the Statute of Westminster gave way to reform.7 Parliament 
passed the Habeas Corpus 74 Act of 1679, 75 which established 
procedural safeguards for the criminally accused and prevented long 
delays between arrest and the bail hearing.76 Despite these proce-
dural safeguards, the Act still left open one glaring problem sur-
rounding bail-judges setting "impossibly high bail" amounts such 
that defendants could not afford pretrial release.77 These high bail 
amounts operated as an effective denial of bail and lead to 
defendants being detained indefinitely. 78 However, the passage of 
917 (2013) ("For all offenses that were bailable, officers of the crown had no 
power to deny bail: persons accused of bailable offenses 'shall from henceforth be 
let out by sufficient Surety, whereof the Sheriff will be answerable and that 
without giving ought of their Goods." (quoting Statute of Westminster 1275, 3 
Edw. 1c. 15 (Eng.))). 
71 See Carbone, supranote 56, at 524. 
72 See Hegreness, supranote 70, at 918 ("[F]or all of English history, from before 
the [Norman] Conquest until the time of American independence, only the most 
serious of felonies were not bailable, and bail was available not as a matter of 
judicial discretion but as a matter of right.").
73 See Carbone, supranote 56, at 527-29. 
7' Habeas Corpus, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Habeas corpus 
means "that you have the body." Id. Habeas corpus is meant to ensure that a 
person's imprisonment or detention is not illegal. Id. While habeas corpus 
provides defendants with the right to be heard and to be released from unlawful 
detention, the Constitution does not indicate when such detention is unlawful. See 
Hegreness, supranote 70, at 912. 
75 Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Cha. 2 c. 2 (Eng.). 
76 See Carbone, supranote 56, at 528. 
77 See Caleb Foote, The Coming ConstitutionalCrisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. 
REV. 959, 967 (1965) [hereinafter Foote, ConstitutionalCrisisin Bail] (noting that 
"by setting impossibly high bail the judges erected another obstacle to thwart the 
purpose of the law on pretrial detention"). 
78 See Hegreness, supranote 70, at 919 ("After the Habeas Corpus Act []... one 
great loophole remained: Officials could 'requir[e] bail to a greater amount than 
the nature of the case demands.' Such excessive bail was a defacto denial of bail 
for bailable offense, violating the spirit, though not the letter, of the law." (quoting 
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *297)). 
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the English Bill of Rights in 1689 quickly closed this judicial loop-
hole, 79 as it provided people with the first prohibition against exces-
sive bail. 80 Eventually, all these protections against abusive bail 
practices-including bail as a matter of right in noncapital cases, 
habeas corpus, and protection against excessive bail-became 
fundamental to bail in colonial America. 81 
However, while America's Constitutional framers adopted 
many of the essential bail rights from English Parliament, the 
framers left out explicit language regarding an absolute right to bail 
in noncapital cases. 82 Instead, the framers afforded citizens no 
federal right to bail, leaving the right to bail in the hands of Con-
gress and the states. 83 Following the ratification of the United States 
Constitution, Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789,84 which 
79 English Bill of Rights of 1689, 1W. & M. Session 2 c. 2 (Eng.).
80 See Hegreness, supra note 70, at 919. The English Bill of Rights excessive 
clause reads: "That excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines 
imposed nor cmell and unusuall Punishments inflicted." See id at 919 n.30 
(quoting English Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 W. & M. Session 2 c. 2 (Eng.)). 
81 See id at 919 ("These constitutional statutes were the pillars of bail in colonial 
America and shaped the colonists' understanding of bail."). 
82 See Foote, ConstitutionalCrisisin Bail, supra note 77, at 968. These elements 
the framers integrated from English Parliament included: (1) the distinction 
between bailable offenses, nonbailable offenses, and those left to the discretion of 
the judges who determine a defendant's ability to make bail; (2) effective habeas 
corpus procedures for accused detained pretrial; and (3) protection against exces-
sive bail. See id; see also Hegreness, supra note 70, at 946 ("The Federal Consti-
tution, therefore, does not explicitly guarantee the right to bail [.]").
83 Carbone, supranote 56, at 533. After describing the states enactment of a right 
to bail, Carbone notes "The Constitution of the United States... guarantees only a 
right to have bail determined in accordance with law. Every person subject to 
arrest enjoys.., a guarantee that the bail set not be excessive. But the Constitution 
does not define which crimes are bailable, nor which defendants can be detained. 
That definition-the definition establishing the parameters of the right to bail-
remains entrusted to Congress and the states." 
84 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91. The Act reads "And upon all 
arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may 
be death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but by the supreme or a circuit 
court, or by a justice of the supreme court, or ajudge of a district court, who shall 
exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and circumstances of the 
offence, and of the evidence, and the usages of law." 
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worked in concert with the Eighth Amendment 85 to create three 
distinctive features surrounding bail: (1) that bail should not be 
excessive; (2) that defendants' right to bail in noncapital cases vests 
upon the discretion of the court; and (3) that bail is meant to assure 
the appearance of the accused at trial.86 While these features would 
remain largely untouched until the mid-twentieth century,87 the 
consequences of the framers' omission of an explicit, absolute right 
to bail in noncapital cases has caused uncertainty and inconsistency 
among legislatures, courts, and legal scholars today. 88 
C. It's All About the Benjamins: Twentieth Century 
Bail, Its Reform, and the Shift Towards Today's 
Money Bail System 
After the Judiciary Act of 1789, the next major changes to 
bail came in the 1950s with the Supreme Court decision Stack v. 
Boyle.89 After the number of pretrial detainees began to rise, Con-
gress worked to ensure that bail and pretrial release were more 
accessible to the accused. 90 However, after the Nixon Administra-
tion began the "war on crime" in the 1960s and 1970s, the concept 
of bail changed again, making bail less accessible. 91 This last major 
reform to bail culminated with the passing of the 1984 Bail Reform 
Act, which the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional in United 
85 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."). 
86 See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 5. 
87 See infra Section I.C. 
88 For a description of the history and debate surrounding the right to bail, see 
Foote, ConstitutionalCrisisin Bail,supranote 77, at 969-89 (calling the omission 
of an explicit right to bail in the Federal Constitutional an "anomaly," but con-
cluding that a right to bail is implied in the Constitution); see also Hegreness, 
supra note 70, at 915-16 (arguing for the Fourteenth Amendment to protect 
citizens' right to bail); see also infra Section I.C (discussing the inconsistencies 
among the Supreme Court, Congress, and the general public with regard to bail); 
infra Part II. 
89 See Stackv. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).90 See Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (repealed 1983). 
91 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
1837; see also infra Section I.C.3. 
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States v. Salerno.92 Since that time, the decision to grant or deny bail 
has largely remained within the discretion of the judiciary, who may 
effectively deny bail based on the accused's potential dangerousness 
to the community.93 
1. Give'em the Loot: The Supreme Court 
Takes on Bail, PartI 
In the 1950s, the Supreme Court decided two watershed 
cases that led to Congress's passage of the Federal Bail Reform Act 
of 1966. 9' In 1951, the Court decided Stack v. Boyle, 95 which held 
that persons arrested for a noncapital offense are unequivocally 
entitled to bail as of right.96 In Stack, the trial court set a uniform 
bail at $50,000 for each of the twelve defendants, 97 despite the 
defendants providing the judge with evidence of their indigence and 
inability to pay the high bail amount.98 Ordering that the case be 
remanded to fix a reasonable bail for each of the defendants, the 
Court determined that setting an unusually high bail amount based 
on the indictment alone is arbitrary. 99 The Court reasoned that 
pretrial release gives the accused an opportunity to prepare a defense 
92 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987) (upholding the 1984 Bail 
Reform Act as constitutional against due process claims). 
93 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (1984) ("The judicial officer shall order the pretrial release 
of the [accused] ... unless the judicial officer determines that such release ... will 
endanger the safety of any other person or the community."). 
9' See Stack, 342 U.S. at 1; Carlsonv. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 524 (1952).
95 Stack, 342 U.S. at 1. 
96 Stack, 342 U.S. at 4 (explaining that "[u]nless the right to bail before trial is 
preserved, the presumption of innocence would lose its meaning").
97 The defendants in Stack were arrested for violating the Smith Act, an anti-
communist regime, and were charged with conspiracy to overthrow the govern-
ment. Id. at 3. The trial court initially set bail for each defendant at a range from 
$2,500 to $100,000; however, the government motioned for the trial court to 
increase bail to $50,000 for each defendant. Id. 
98 d. In granting the government's motion to increase bail, the trial court relied on 
information that four people, who were previous charged with the same violation 
of the Smith Act and released, had forfeited their bail and fled. Id. However, none 
of those four fleeing defendants were the twelve defendants in Stack. Id.at 4. 
99 See id.at 6-7. 
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and prevents the government from inflicting punishment before a 
°° conviction. 1 Justice Jackson's concurring opinion, however, may 
have laid the groundwork for the Court and Congress to decline bail 
rights in the future. 1° 1 Justice Jackson determined that not every 
defendant is entitled to bail, but instead, is only entitled to a reason-
able opportunityto make bail. 
102 
03 Three months later, the Court decided Carlsonv. Landon,1 
which limited the Court's holding in Stack.10 4 In Carlson, the 
Department of Immigration and Natural Services detained individu-
als and charged them with being foreign aliens who were members 
05 of the Communist Party. 1 Notably, the Department argued that 
pretrial detention was warranted because the arrestees were previous 
members of the Communist Party who posed a danger to the United 
States.106 After determining that the defendants were properly 
denied bail, 10 7 the Supreme Court-following Justice Jackson's 
100 See id. at 4-5. The Court further held: "The right to release before trial is condi-
tioned upon the accused's giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and 
submit to sentence if found guilty..... [T]he modem practice of requiring a bail 
bond or the deposit of a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional 
assurance of the presence of the accused. Bail set at a figure higher than an amount 
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth 
Amendment." Id. at 5. 
Id.(internal citations omitted). 
101 See id. at 10 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
102 See id. 
103 Carlson,342 U.S. at 524. 
104 Compare Stack, 342 U.S. at 6 (Vinson C.J.) (describing a defendant's right to 
bail as "unequivocal"), with Carlson, 342 U.S. at 545 (denouncing any absolute 
right to bail and holding the excessive bail clause merely provides that bail shall 
not be excessive). 
105 Carlson, 342 U.S. at 527. The arrestees brought forth numerous claims, 
including violations to their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights, their Eighth 
Amendment rights, and a constitutional attack on to the Immigration Act that 
allowed for their pre-deportation detention. Id.106 Id.at 529. 
107 Id. at 541 ("[B]ecause of Congress's understanding of [alien Communists] 
attitude towards the use of force and violence in such a constitutional democracy 
[,]...evidence of membership plus personal activity in supporting and extending 
the Party's philosophy concerning violence gives adequate ground for deten-
tion."). 
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concurrence in Stack° 8-ruled that the Eighth Amendment did not 
provide "a right to bail in all cases, but merely ... that bail shall not 
be excessive." 10 9 Thus, leading into the 1960s, the Supreme Court's 
decisions established that bail and pretrial release were important, 
but not unlimited. 0 
2. Blowin' Money Fast: Moving Away 
from Money Bail with the Manhattan 
Bail Project and the 1966 Federal Bail 
Reform Act 
The mid 1960s brought changes to earlier bail procedures, 
marking the first significant bail legislation since the Judiciary Act 
of 1789.111 Judges-similar to English judges before the passage of 
the English Bill of Rights in 1689 _used their discretionary 
authority to set high and unattainable bail amounts for defendants to 
prevent their release before trial. 113 Justice initiative groups began to 
notice the effect that these discretionary decisions had on the 
poor.1 14 Empirical evidence gathered in the wake of the Stack and 
Carlson decisions concluded that individuals unable to post bail 
108 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 10 (Jackson, J., concurring) (finding that "not... every 
defendant is entitled to bail [] ... but he is entitled to an opportunity to make 
[bail] in a reasonable amount").
109 Carlson,342 U.S. at 545. The Court went on to hold, "the very language of the 
[Eighth] Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable." Id. 
110 See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 9 ("With these two cases, the Supreme Court 
established that while a right to bail is a fundamental precept of the law, it is not 
absolute."). 
...See Appleman, supranote 12, 1329-30. 
112 See supranotes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
113 See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 10. 
114 See Caleb Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in 
Philadelphia,102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1035 (1954) [hereinafter Foote, Compel-
ling Appearance in Court] (describing that once state courts had failed to consider 
an accused's financial condition in the bail-setting process, "[t]he elimination of 
the financial factor resulted in bail being set in amounts which. . . 'are too low to 
deter the rich, but high enough to prohibit the poor"' (quoting Reginald Heber 
Smith, Justiceandthe Poor,23 CAMPBELL L. REv. 74 (1919))). 
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were not only poor,115 but also more likely to be convicted than 
defendants released pretrial. 116 As a result, the Manhattan Bail Pro-
ject of 1961 took hold, helping criminally accused secure pretrial 
release while providing an alternative to the money bail system.117 
The Manhattan Bail Project's purpose was to test whether 
more defendants could be released on their own recognizance if 
judicial officers were given more information on defendants' char-
acter and reputation within the community. 118 The Project operated 
under the assumption that defendants with close ties to the commu-
nity were the least likely to flee. 119 After measuring defendants' 
likelihood of fleeing based on communal ties, 120 the Project's 
workers recommended to the courts the best candidates to be 
released on their own recognizance in lieu of a money bond. 
121 
Ultimately, the Project succeeded-not only because less than 1% of 
the total defendants released on their own recognizance failed to 
appear in court122 -but also because the Project's success gained 
national attention, paving the way for Congress to codify bail 
reform. 123 
115 See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 10; see also Neil, supranote 9, at 6 ("In 1954, 
reports began to show that an increasing majority of people detained while 
awaiting trial were of low income.").
116 See Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court, supra note 114, at 1058 ("[A] 
jailed defendant's inability to search out evidence and persuade witnesses [oin his 
behalf to testify ...suggests that the handicap of being in jail may result in a 
number of convictions which would not occur were the defendant given his liberty 
during the pretrial period."). 
7See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 10. 
118 See Gottlieb, supranote 49, at 7. 
119 See Carbone, supranote 56, at 552-53. Carbone indicates that the Manhattan 
Bail Project used a point system to measure defendants' communal ties and also 
considered "defendant[s'] prior record, family ties in the area, employment or 
school attendance, and length of residence in the community." Id. at 533. 
120 See id. 
121 See Carbone, supra note 56, at 552-53; see also Schnacke, supranote 13, at 10 
(" [Tlhe Manhattan Bail Project was designed to provide information to the court 
about a defendant's ties to the community and thereby hope that the court would 
release the defendant without requiring a bail bond.").
122 See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 10. 
123See Carbone, supranote 56, at 533. 
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After the Manhattan Bail Project, Congress passed the Bail 
Reform Act of 1966.124 Congress passed the Act in hopes of encour-
aging judges to use nonmonetary release conditions due to money 
bail's adverse effect on the poor.125 The Act mandated that pretrial 
release be based on the most minimal release conditions possible 
while still ensuring defendants appeared at trial. 126 Ultimately, the 
Bail Reform Act of 1966 was a high mark for Congress and the 
criminal justice system, as it made bail and pretrial release more 
accessible to poor defendants accused of low-level, nonviolent 
crimes. 127 The Act affirmed the presumption in favor of pretrial 
release and moved away from judges' practice of setting impractical 
monetary bail requirements. 128 Moreover, the Act did not permit 
judges to consider defendants' potential danger to the community if 
released before trial. 129 However, a change in political power 
brought
130 a new regime that continues to affect pretrial release 
today. 
124 See Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (repealed 1983); see 
also Bail:An Ancient PracticeReexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 976 (1961) (noting 
that where risk of flight is great, "judges frequently [] deny bail in such cases 
simply by setting bail so high that the accused cannot meet it," which is contrary 
to the statutory and constitutional protections of many jurisdictions).
125 See State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 350 (Minn. 2000) (en banc) (summari-
zing the events leading to the passage of the 1966 Bail Reform Act).
126 18 U.S.C. §3146(a) ("Any person charged with an offense, other than an 
offense punishable by death, shall ... be ordered release pending trial[,] ...unless 
the [judicial] officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a 
release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required."); see 
also GOTTLIEB, supranote 49, at 6 (indicating that the Federal Bail Reform Act of 
1966 sought to make the bail decision more fair and rationale, requiring judges to 
release defendants on the "least restrictive conditions that would ensure their 
appearance at trial"). 
127 Carbone, supra note 56, at 554-55 ("The Bail Reform Act [of 1966] ... permit 
[ted] greater pretrial release of those unlikely to face harsh sanctions after trial.").128 See id. at 553. 
129 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (omitting any consideration of defen-
dants' future dangerousness in pretrial release decisions).
130 See infra Section I.C.3. 
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3. Dead Presidents: The Nixon Effect 
and the Bail Reform Act of 1984 
After Congress ushered in a new era of bail reform in the 
1960s, public concern over America's recent increase in crime, par-
ticularly among defendants out on bond pending trial, called for a 
more restrictive bail process.131 Because judges could not consider a 
noncapital defendant's potential dangerousness to the community, 
many saw the 1966 Bail Reform Act as failing to address public 
safety.132 Once President Richard Nixon was elected, however, bail 
considerations and bail accessibility began to change.133 President 
Nixon's "law and order" campaign mandated pretrial detention for 
criminally accused who presented a clear danger to the commu-
nity.134 President Nixon's campaign ultimately led to a major 
change in bail, as it allowed courts to detain noncapital defendants 
prior to trial without bail based solely on their potential danger to 
the community. 135 
In response to the increased crime rates involving pretrial 
detainees as perpetrators, 136 Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of 
1984 in conjunction with the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984.137 While the 1984 Bail Reform Act restated Congress' earlier 
initiatives to keep pretrial release the rule and pretrial detention the 
exception, the Act nonetheless allowed judges to deny defendants 
131 See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 17. 
132 See id. ("Highly publicized violent crimes committed by defendants while 
released pretrial prompted calls for more restrictive bail policies and led to grow-
ing dissatisfaction with laws that did not permit judges to consider danger to the 
community in setting release conditions."). 
133 See Hegreness, supra note 70, at 915 ("Th[e] war on bail, along with the 
broader war on crime, began with President Nixon's election in 1968.").
134 See id. at 956-58. 
135 See id. 
136 See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 17 ("The 1970s ushered in a new era for the 
bail reform movement, one characterized by heightened public concern over 
crime, including crimes committed by persons released on a bail bond."); see also 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (noting the increased rate in 
crime among those out on bond).
137 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50. 
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pretrial release based on the defendants' flight risk or potential dan-
ger to the community.138 If a judge determines that no condition 
would ensure either the accused's presence at trial or the safety of 
the community, the Act then allows judges to detain the accused 
without bail. 139 Thus, the 1984 Bail Reform Act shifted the focus of 
pretrial detention away from the concern of undermining the pre-
sumption of innocence and towardsthe use of pretrial detention as a 
means of regulating the safety of the community.140 
4. Paid in Full: The Supreme Court Takes 
on Bail, PartII 
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 brought change to America's 
bail system. 141 Public safety and the well-being of the community 
became the linchpin of an accused's pretrial bail determination, as 
bail proceedings focused almost exclusively on the accused's future 
danger to the community. 142 As one scholar notes, the last Supreme 
Court case to deal with the right to bail, UnitedStates v. Salerno,
143 
ended the hope of invalidating the 1984 Bail Reform Act. 144 This 
occurred when the Supreme Court, with Chief Justice William 
138 See generally Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) ("The judicial 
officer shall order the pretrial release of the [accused] ... unless the judicial offi-
cer determines that such release... will endanger the safety of any other person or 
the community."); see also Applemaii supranote 12, at 1331. 
139 18 U.S.C. § 31483142(e).
140 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1333-35 (holding that the Bail Reform Act of 
1984 and the Supreme Court's decision in Salerno "struck a blow to concepts of 
retributive criminal justice [,]" which is predicated on the belief that a person can 
only be punished for a crime the person has committed (citing United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987))).
141 See supra Section I.C.3. 
142 See id. at 1330 ("The [Bail Reform Act of 1984] was predicated on protection 
of the public and community safety, making this factor one of the most critical in 
the determination of whether to release or detain defendants before trial.").
143 481 U.S. 739, 739 (1987). 
144 See Hegreness, supra note 70, at 959. But see Appleman, supra note 12, at 
1349 (arguing that the Salerno decision, while rejecting facial challenges to the 
1984 Bail Reform Act, still leaves open the possibility for as-applied challenges to 
Act). 
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Rehnquist writing for the majority,14 5 upheld the constitutionality of 
the 1984 Bail Reform Act. 146 
In Salerno, two defendants were arrested and charged with 
racketeering and other crimes stemming from their alleged involve-
ment in one of New York's organized crime families. 147 The 
government argued that because no reasonable condition of the 
defendants' pretrial release could ensure the community's safety, the 
defendants' bail should be withheld. 148 Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court agreed, holding that the 1984 Bail Reform Act adequately 
addressed the growing public concern that pretrial defendants out on 
bail pending trial were dangerous and more likely to commit new 
crimes while on bail. 149 The Court recognized that pretrial detention 
serves the compelling government interest of protecting the safety 
and welfare of the community. 150 Further, the Court rejected the 
defendants' Eighth Amendment challenges, reaffirming principles 
from Carlson v. Landon-that the Eighth Amendment does not 
145 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739. Chief Justice Rehnquist served as Assistant 
Attorney General under President Nixon. See Hegreness, supra note 70, at 959. 
Hegreness notes, "the great victory in Nixon and [John] Mitchell's effort to 
destroy the right to bail came in 1987, when Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had 
been Mitchell's right-hand man as Assistant Attorney General[,] ... wrote the 
majority opinion in Salerno." Id. 
146 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741. 
147 Id. at 743. Combined, the two defendants were charged with twenty-nine 
counts of racketeering, mail wire fraud, extortion, and gambling. Id. The govern-
ment sought to prove that Defendant Salerno was the boss of the Genovese crime 
family and that Defendant Cafaro was a captain in the same crime family, thereby 
presenting a danger to the community. Id. 
148 Id. The government offered evidence of wiretaps implicating the defendants in 
various conspiracies and produced two witnesses testifying as to the defendants' 
involvement in numerous murder conspiracies. Id. 
149 Id. at 746-47 (determining that rising rate of crime committed by those on 
pretrial release was "a pressing societal problem" wherein the 1984 Bail Reform 
Act could be a "potential solution").151Id. at 746-52. The Court held that "when Congress has mandated detention on 
the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention of flight ... the Eighth 
Amendment does not require release on bail." Id. at 754-55. 
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bestow an absolute right to bail, but rather prohibits excessive bail 
from being imposed. 
151 
After the Salerno decision, courts shifted focus in bail deter-
minations from defendants' communal ties and likelihood of appear-
ing at trial152 to the defendants' potential danger to the community if 
released. 153 As Justice Marshall argued in his dissent in Salerno, this 
shift exhibits the deterioration of the presumption of innocence in 
pretrial proceedings. 154 The tension that the Supreme Court deci-
sions on bail, the Bail Reform Projects, and the Bail Reform Acts 
created has spilled over to and caused conflict among the states. 155 
The inconsistency with bail has also led to differing views amongst 
the states with respect to cash-only bail. 
156 
II. MONEY, CASH, WOES: CASH-ONLY BAIL AND 
MONEY BAIL AMONGST THE STATES 
Judges may consider a number of different factors when 
setting bail; however, none are more important in the eyes of state 
legislatures than ensuring defendants' appearance in court and 
151 See id. at 754-55; see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952) 
(holding that the excessive bail clause provides that bail shall not be excessive 
rather than an absolute right to bail). The Court in Salerno also expressly rejected 
the Stack Court's use of the Excessive Bail Clause to provide a right to bail for all 
defendants, indicating: 
"The Court in Stack had no occasion to consider whether the Excessive Bail 
Clause requires courts to admit all defendants to bail, because the statute before 
the Court in that case in fact allowed the defendants to be bailed. Thus, the Court 
had to determine only whether bail, admittedly available in that case, was exces-
sive if set at a sum greater than that necessary to ensure the arrestees' presence at 
trial." Salerno,481 U.S. at 753. 
152 See supra Sections 1.C. 1-2. 
153See supra Sections I.C.3-4. 
154 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 763 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[A]t the end of the day 
the presumption of innocence protects the innocent; the shortcuts we take with 
those whom we believe to be guilty injure only those wrongfully accused and, ulti-
mately, ourselves.").
155 See infraPart II. 
156 See infraPart II. 
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potential danger to the community. 15 7 Although cash bail is the most 
frequently used method of bail, 158 courts rarely give weight to a 
defendant's financial resources and ability to post bail.159 Instead, 
judges use their discretion to set extraordinarily high bail amounts 
that are nonetheless reasonable based on "bail schedules" and the 
seriousness of the crime charged. 160 A recent trend is for judges to 
impose a cash-only bail, which requires defendants to post the entire 
bond amount in cash to the court, without using any other security, 
surety, or discounted amount. 161 Rather than individualizing the 
process to determine an accused's flight risk,162 courts often only 
review the charged offense and set a specific cash-only bail amount 
based off that charge. 
16 3 
Moreover, because there is no explicit right to bail in the 
federal constitution, 164 courts reviewing cash-only bail challenges 
treat such challenges as solely a state constitutional issue. 165 When 
reviewing cash-only bail challenges, courts interpret their states' 
sufficient sureties clauses-also known as the Consensus Right to 
Bail Clause166 -which provides that all persons accused of non-
157 See Lester, supranote 31, at 3. 
158 See Wice, supranote 48, at 10. 
159 See id. at 25-26. 
160 See Lester, supranote 31 at 26-28. 
161See State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 346 n.1 (Mfinn. 2000) (en banc) (referring 
to cash-only bail as judges setting a monetary bail amount satisfied only by defen-
dants posting the full amount set by the court). 
162 See Bail:An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supranote 124, at 975-77 (advoca-
ting for the use of individualized bail determinations that consider an accused's 
communal ties and financial resources). 
163 See infra Section II.A. 
164 See Foote, ConstitutionalCrisisin Bail, supra note 77, at 969-89 (noting no 
explicit right to bail in the federal constitution); see also Fragoso v. Fell, 111 P.3d 
1027, 1030 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) ("The United States Constitution is not implica-
ted; although the Eight Amendment protects against excessive bail, 'there is no 
federal constitutional right to bail."' (quoting Rendel v. Mummert, 474 P.2d 824, 
826-27 (1970))). 
165 See State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 55 (Wash. 2014) ("Because the federal consti-
tution contains no clause requiring that defendants be bailable by sufficient sure-
ties, this is purely a question of state constitutional law."). 
166 See infra Section I.B. 
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capital offenses are entitled to bail by sufficient sureties.167 Courts, 
when deciding the constitutionality of cash-only bail, analyze the 
text, history, intent of the framers, and purpose of their states' 
Consensus Right to Bail Clause to determine whether cash-only bail 
serves as a sufficient surety.161 
A. Money Affiliated: Factors that State Court 
Judges Analyze When Setting Bail 
Generally, when judges set bail, they must keep in mind the 
goals of bail, including (1) the defendant's appearance in court; 169 
(2) the safety of the community; 170 and (3) the defendant's liberty 
interest before conviction. 171 Also, to ensure an impartial and holis-
tic bail determination, judges consider various factors and balance 
them with the aforementioned goals. 172 Despite a plethora of factors 
and circumstances available to judges when setting bail, 173 most 
courts consider four factors in particular: (1) the accused's criminal 
history; (2) the accused's reputation within, and dangerousness to, 
the community; (3) the accused's ties to the community, including 
167 See Hegreness, supranote 70, at 923 (indicating the most common language of 
the clause reads: "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for 
capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great"). 
168 See infra Sections 11.C. 1-2. 
169 See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 14. 
170 See Appleman, supranote 12, at 1330. 
171 See Lester, supranote 31, at 3. 
172 See State v. Gutierrez,) 140 P.3d 1106, 1109 (N.M.2006) (holding that in deter-
mining bail, the court must "balance the defendant's interest in pretrial release 
with the State's interest in securing the defendant's appearance at trial and the 
interest in safeguarding the community from any potential threat"). 
173 See Lester, supra note 31, at 55. These other factors in setting bail include: 
(1) the accused's history of appearing in court; (2) the accused's ability to make 
bail; (3) the accused's funds used to make bail and financial resources; (4) the 
probability of committing a crime if released; (5) protecting the public or preven-
ing danger to society; (6) the weight of evidence against the accused; (7) the 
accused's flight risk; (8) whether reasonable restrictions could be placed on the 
accused in allowing pretrial release; (9) whether the accused accrued new charges 
while on pretrial release; and (10) prosecutors' or pretrial services' recommenda-
tions. See id.; see also Weiss, supranote 26. 
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employment, family, and property; and (4) the nature of the charged 
offense. 174 Some states inquire into the defendant's financial resour-
ces, but few actually inquire into a defendant's ability to post bail. 
175 
In addition, state courts often use bail schedules to guide 
their decisions. 176 Bail schedules are predetermined bail amounts 
based on the accused's charges. 177 Bail schedules seek to standar-
dize the bail-setting process, provide guidance to judiciaries, and 
increase efficiency. 178 However, these predetermined bail amounts 
often vary by county and provide judges with little-to-no guidance 
on an accused's dangerousness or likelihood of appearing in 
court. 179 Furthermore, the bail schedule amounts often become the 
defendant's actual bail amount, 180 leaving no room for individu-
alized bail proceedings or judicial discretion. 181 Even if judges do 
174 See id at 24; see also Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supranote 124, 
at 974 (noting that bail is often set based on the offense because the greater the 
punishment the defendant faces, the more incentive he has to flee).
175 See Lester, supranote 31, at 25 (citing Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Nevada, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia as those states that "inquire specific-
ally into the defendant's ability to pay a bond if set"); see also Wice, supranote 
48, at 14 ("One of the most ironic aspects of the bail-setting procedure is that the 
factor explored least frequently by the judge has the greatest impact on the defen-
dant's ability to secure pretrial release-his financial status and the amount of bail 
he can afford to pay."). 
176 See Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of JudicialDiscretion?,26 
CRIM. JUST. 12, 13 (2011). Bail schedules are defined as "procedural schemes that 
provide judges with standardized money bail amounts based upon the offense 
charged, regardless of the characteristics of an individual defendant." Id. 
177 See id at 13-14 (noting that many jurisdictions have fixed money bail 
schedules that are predetermined based on the defendant's highest charge); see 
also Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1360 (describing that bail is "largely determined 
by fixed bail schedules, which ... often forces indigent defendants and their 
families to spend money that otherwise would have covered basic necessities"). 
178 See Neil, supra note 9, at 22-23 (describing bail schedules as an arbitrary 
attempt to standardize bail proceedings based on the crime charged).
179 See Neil, supra note 9; see also Carlson, supra note 176, at 16-17 ("To the 
extent that bail schedules encourage judges to surrender their ability to impose 
such discretionary conditions, [bails schedules] mn completely contrary to public 
safety interests.").
180 See Lester, supranote 31, at 25-26. 
181 See Neil, supra note 9, at 23 ("Another concern for bail schedules is that, if 
they are required to be used, judicial discretion in the bail setting is limited."); see 
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not use bail schedules, outside pressures such as newspapers, media 
outlets, politics, and the community as a whole may cause judges to 
stay away from pretrial release, fearing adverse public opinion or 
disapproval if they release defendants who end up committing new182 
crimes. 
B. Universal Language: The Consensus Right to 
Bail Clause Among the States 
Just as United States citizens have certain bail protections 
from the federal government,1 8 3 states have protected their citizens 
with what has been collectively known as the Consensus Right to 
Bail Clause. i1 4 In 1682, Pennsylvania was the first state to draft the 
Consensus Right to Bail Clause.18 5 The most common phrasing of 
the Clause reads, "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sure-
also Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 974 (arguing that 
the offense should not be the only determinant in setting bail, as courts should 
consider the defendant's community reputation and ties, past criminal record, and 
the defendant's likelihood of guilt). The American Bar Association has rejected 
the use of bail schedules and has declared that "[b]ail schedules are arbitrary and 
inflexible [. Bail schedules] exclude consideration of factors other than the charge 
that may be far more relevant to the likelihood that the defendant will appear for 
court dates." See Standards for Criminal Justice: Pretrial Release § 10-5.3(e) cmt. 
at 113, AM. BAR Ass'N (2007), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publications/criminaljusticestandards/pretrial release.authcheckdam.pdf [here-
inafter Standards]. 
182 See Wice, supra note 48, at 15, 25 (noting that "pressures exerted on the 
judiciary by the press and general public influence the bail-setting decision' and 
publicity from the mass media may cause judiciaries to "adopt[] a very cautious 
position on pretrial release"); see also Lester, supranote 31, at 44 ("When faced 
with the political backlash of letting a 'dangerous' suspect back out on the street, 
what judicial officer would not be biased towards detention?"). 
183 See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 5 (indicating three distinct features surrounding 
bail in America after the Eighth Amendment and Judiciary Act of 1789, including 
bail as a means of assuring the accused's presence at trial, a right to bail in non-
capital cases, and a right against excessive bail). 
184 See Hegreness, supranote 70, at 923. 
185 See id at 920 (describing Pennsylvania's bail scheme as "the true prototype for 
the Consensus Right to Bail Clause [that would be] enshrined in the majority of 
state constitutions"). 
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ties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the 
' 1presumption great." 8 6 Forty-two of the fifty states have adopted this 
Clause within their state constitutions, 187 while another six states 
have protected the right to bail by statute. 188 However, with the 
federal decline in bail rights in the 1970s and 1980s, 189 states began 
to follow the federal model and consider bail based on defendants' 
danger to the community or pretrial flight risk.190 Nevertheless, 
today, forty-eight states have protected this Consensus Right to Bail 
either statutorily or constitutionally. 191 
C. Money, Power, Respect: Cash-Only Bail and Its 
Constitutionality Among the States 
With the majority of states providing a right to bail through 
their state constitutions or statutes, the question of whether cash-
only bail is a "sufficient surety" within the meaning of the Consen-
sus Right to Bail Clause has provided a split among state courts.192 
Eight states have ruled that cash-only bail is constitutional, while 
seven states have ruled that cash-only bail is unconstitutional. 193 The 
remaining thirty-four states have either not yet been presented with 
an opportunity to rule on the issue, or have declined to rule on the 
issue directly. 194  The substantial-public-interest exception has 
allowed courts to hear such challenges notwithstanding the moot-
116 Id. at 920, 923. 
187 See id.at 921-23. Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New York, Virginia, and West Virginia are the eight states that have not provided a 
Consensus Right to Bail Clause in their constitutions. See id.at 969-96. 
188 See id. at 949 (explaining that the Consensus Right to Bail was given constitu-
tional and statutory protection in forty-eight of the fifty states).
189 See supra Sections I.C.3-4. 
190 See Hegreness, supra note 70, at 962 ("[MV]ost [states] followed the Bail 
Reform Act [of 1984] and made it lawful to deny bail to persons who courts find 
pose a danger to the community or are likely to flee."). 
191 See id. at 969-96 (providing tables with each states' constitutions over the 
course of history and their modification of the Consensus Right to Bail Clause). 
192 See id. at 940 ("Courts have recently split over whether the Right to Bail 
Clause in their state constitutions prohibits cash-only bail.").
193See infra Sections 11.C. 1-2. 
194 See infJa Section II.C.3. 
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ness doctrine1 95 and subsequent events in an accused's criminal 
prosecution. 196 In determining the constitutionality of cash-only bail, 
courts have utilized canons of interpretation to determine whether 
cash-only bail constitutes a sufficient surety. 197 Although indigent 
defendants have raised Equal Protection claims, arguing that cash-
only bail violates equal protection under the law, some courts con-
tinue to treat the issue as strictly a matter of interpretation. 198 
1. Put Your Money Where Your 
Mouth Is: States Ruling Cash-
Only Bail Constitutional 
2 1Eight states-Alabama, 199 Arizona,200 Arkansas, Colora-d02 201 204 25206do,2°2 Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico,2 °5 and Wyoming -have 
195 Mootness Doctrine, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("The princi-
ple that American courts will not decide moot cases-that is, cases in which there 
is no longer any actual controversy."). 
196 See, e.g., Tmjillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 804 (Ark. 2016) ("Because the 
imposition of 'cash only' bail affects all criminal defendants seeking pretrial 
release, the public, our judiciary and members of the bar, it falls within the 
purview of the exception to the mootness doctrine as an issue of substantial public 
interest."); see also State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 348 (Minn. 2000) (en banc) 
(noting that failing to decide the constitutionality of cash-only bail "could have a 
continuing adverse impact on those defendants who are unable to post a cash only 
bail"). 
197 See, e.g., Trujillo, 483 S.W.3d at 806 (interpreting the meaning of the sufficient 
sureties clause through its ordinary meaning and dictionary definition); State v. 
Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 582 (Iowa 2003) (looking to the intent ofthe framers of 
Iowa's state constitution to determine the meaning of sufficient sureties); State v. 
Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106, 1111 (N.M. 2006) (analyzing what the purposeof bail 
is to interpret whether cash-only bail is a sufficient surety). 
198 See Neil, supra note 9, at 15-16 ("Current practices allow for people to be 
treated differently within the criminal justice system on account of their financial 
status [which] is believed to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."); see 
also O'Donnell v. HarrisCry, 2018 WL 851776, at *10 (Feb. 14, 2018) ("[T]he 
incarceration of those who cannot pay money bail, without meaningful considera-
tion of other possible alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal protec-
tion requirements.").199 See Williams v. City of Montgomery, 739 So. 2d 515 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). 
200 See Fragoso v. Fell, 111 P.3d 1027 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
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held that cash-only bail constitutes a sufficient surety. Among other 
things, these courts have looked to the history of their constitutions 
to uncover the meaning of "sufficient sureties. 2 °7 For example, in 
Fragosov. Fell,208police charged the defendant as a co-conspirator 
in a conspiracy to sell marijuana.20 9 The trial judge set bond at 
"$50,000 cash" and denied the defendant's request to put up 
$50,000 worth of real estate in lieu of the cash amount.21 ° In 
response to the defendant's argument that Arizona law does not 
explicitly authorize cash-only bail, the Arizona Court of Appeals 
held that cash-only bail constituted a sufficient surety. 211 The court 
reasoned that America's expanding frontier and rural areas made 
cash the only conceivable means of ensuring the defendant's 
appearance at trial.212 Thus, the court determined that, at the time 
Arizona adopted its Consensus Right to Bail Clause, Arizona's 
constitutional framers intended to permit cash-only bail.213 
In addition to history, courts have looked to the textual 
meaning of the sufficient sureties language to determine cash-only 
bail's constitutionality. For example, in State v. Briggs,214 the dis-
trict court imposed a $6,500 cash-only bond for the defendant jump-
201 See Trujillo, 483 S.W.3d at 801. 
202 See Fullertonv. Cty. Court, 124 P.3d 866 (Colo. App. 2005). 
203 See State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 2003). 
204 See State v. Jackson, 384 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. 2012). 
205 See State v. Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106 (N.M.2006) 
206 See Saunders v. Hornecker, 344 P.3d 771 (Wyo. 2015). 
207 See id.at 778-79 (explaining that Wyoming and other courts to be confronted 
with the issue of whether cash-only bail is constitutional have looked to the 
meaning of the "sufficient sureties" and interpreting the clause either broadly or 
narrowly). 
208 See Fragoso, 111 P.3d at 1027 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).219 Id. at 1029. 
210 Id. The trial judge initially set bail at $250,000, but lowered the amount to 
$50,000 cash-only. Id.211 Id. at 1031-34. 
212 Id. at 1032-33. 
213 See id. at 1033 ("We have no basis for concluding that the drafters of our con-
stitution intended to foreclose a cash-only restriction as one of the conditions by 
which [assuring the defendant's presence at trial] could be attained.").
214 See Briggs,666 N.W.2d at 573 (Iowa 2003). 
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ing bail on a prostitution charge. 215 In holding cash-only bail consti-
tutional, the Iowa Supreme Court determined that Iowa's constitu-
tional framers used the sufficient sureties language to create access 
to a surety in some form; however, the framers did not intend to give 
individuals unlimited access to any surety.216 The court held that the 
framers qualified "surety" with "sufficient" to give judges discretion 
within the bail-setting process, and cash-only bail is within the 
purview of that discretion.217 
These courts have also held that the purpose of each state's 
Consensus Right to Bail Clause should be interpreted broadly when 
analyzing the constitutionality of cash-only bail. 218 For example, in 
Saunders v. Hornecker219-in which two of three defendants were 
unable to post their initial cash bonds of $500 and $2,00022-the 
Wyoming Supreme Court determined that because the purpose of 
bail was to ensure the accused's presence at trial, the sufficient 
sureties clause should be interpreted broadly so as to allow for 
215 d. at 574-75. 
216 See id. at 582 (holding that the framer's use of historical lineage to draft the 
sufficient surety language "was a clear creation of a right to access a surety of 
some form [, but] ... d[id] not indicate that the framers intended that a person 
should be bailable by any surety without limit") (emphasis in original). 
217 See id. at 582 ("By including this ["sufficient"] qualification for a surety, the 
framers carved out a measure of discretion for the person overseeing the bailing 
process."). 
218 See, e.g., Saunders v. Homecker, 344 P.3d 771, 780-81 (Wyo. 2015) (holding 
that the purpose and language of the words "sufficient surety" allows for cash-only 
bail as a broad, constitutionally permissible means for ensuring the defendant's 
presence at trial). 2 19 JId. at 771. 
220 Id. at 773-74. Three defendants-Amos, Dwyer, and Saunders-had their 
cases consolidated because each defendant challenged the imposition of their cash-
only bonds. Id. The trial judge set Defendant Amos's bond at $2,000 cash-only 
based on charges of interfering with a peace officer and carrying a concealed 
weapon. Id.at 774. Defendant Dwyer failed to appear in court for an earlier charge 
of failing to maintain liability coverage and his bond was set at $500 cash-only. Id. 
Notably, Dwyer plead guilty and the trial judge sentenced him to 23 days in jail, 
which was equivalent to the time Dwyer already served in jail before his plea. Id. 
Saunders, on the other hand, received a $100,000 cash bail after being arrested on 
a warrant for aggravated assault. Id. 
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judges to impose cash-only bail.221 Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court in Trujillo v. State,222 defined a sufficient surety as "an 
adequate guarantee to ensure the accused's presence at trial. 223 
Because cash is one of many broad methods to ensure such appear-
ance, the court in Trujillo held that cash-only bail constitutes a 
sufficient surety.224 Unlike the defendants in Saunders, however, 
Trujillo's charges appeared much more serious, as police charged 
Trujillo with assault and battery on his pregnant girlfriend and her 
son.225 Therefore, these courts also impose cash-only bond where 
the alleged crime is severe. 226 
Like Arkansas, New Mexico has also considered the severity 
of the crime and the safety of the community in analyzing cash-only 
228 bail claims.227 In State v. Gutierrez, for example, the defendant 
was indicted on multiple counts of murder and manslaughter, and 
the trial court set bond at $300,000 cash-only.229 The New Mexico 
Supreme Court upheld cash-only bail as a constitutionally permis-
sible means of ensuring the safety of the community. 230 While 
defendants have an interest in pretrial release, the court held that this 
interest should be balanced against the State's ultimate goals of 
221 Id. at 780-81. 
222 See Trujillo, 483 S.W.3d at 801 (Ark. 2016). 
223 See id. at 806. 
224 See id. ("[B]ased on the plain language of the constitution and our stated 
purpose for bail, we hold that the term 'sufficient sureties' refers to a broad range 
of methods to accomplish 'sufficient sureties,' including cash."). 
225 Id. at 802. Two of the three defendants in Saunders, 344 P.3d at 774, were 
charged with relatively minor charges, whereas the defendant in Tmjillo, 483 
S.W.3d at 802, hit his thirty-five-week pregnant girlfriend and her son, attempted 
to smother the son, bound his girlfriend, and dunked her under bathtub water. 
Initially, Trujillo posted a $25,000 cash or surety bond and was released. Trujillo, 
483 S.W.3d at 802. However, after violating a no-contact order, the prosecutor 
motioned for Tmjillo's bail to be revoked. Id. At a bail hearing, the trial court set 
Trujillo's bail at $300,000 cash-only. Id. at 803. 
226 See, e.g., Trujillo, 483 S.W.3d at 802; see also State v. Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 
1106 (N.M.2006). 
227 See Gutierrez, 140 P.3d at 1111.228 Id.at 1106. 
2 29 
_d. at 1107. 
23 1d.at 1110-16. 
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securing the safety of the community and ensuring the defendant's 
future appearance in court. 231 The court reasoned that a recogni-
zance bond or any other less restrictive alternative-such as 
electronic monitoring-could not adequately ensure the commu-
nity's safety or Gutierrez's future presence in court.232 Nonetheless, 
the court in Gutierrez cautioned trial judges who impose cash-only 
bonds, indicating that courts should impose the least onerous condi-
tions first and then use cash-only bail as a last resort.233 
In addition to using interpretative canons and other justifica-
tions to uphold cash-only bail as constitutional, these courts have 
noted the similarities and differences between sufficient sureties 
challenges and excessive bail challenges. 234 For example, the Iowa 
Supreme Court in Briggs235 ruled that the right to bail by sufficient 
sureties and the right against excessive bail work together to secure 
community safety, ensure defendants' appearance at trial, and 
protect defendants against abusive bail practices. 236 In State v. 
Jackson,237 however, the Missouri Supreme Court held that because 
the only purpose of bail is to secure the defendant's appearance at 
231 See id. at 161 ("We believe the better approach is to balance the defendant's 
interest in pretrial release with the State's interest in securing the defendant's 
appearance at trial and the interest in safeguarding the community from any 
potential threats."). 
232 See id. 
233 See id. at 162 (" [Wie caution trial judges to follow the directives of the rule in 
exercising their discretion to set conditions of release. The types of secured bonds 
authorized are enumerated in the order of priority in which they are to be con-
sidered, with the least onerous conditions listed first. Cash-only bail is the last 
option and should only be imposed after careful consideration."). 
234 See, e.g., State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 583-84 (Iowa 2003) ("[I]t is 
conceivable that the use of cash-only bail could violate the excessive bail clause 
even though its use does not automatically violate the sufficient sureties' clause."); 
State v. Jackson, 384 S.W.3d 208, 216 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (noting that the 
misuse of cash-only bail as a means to keep defendants in jail is not addressed by 
Missouri's sufficient sureties' clause, but rather addressed by Missouri's excessive 
bail clause).
235 666 N.W.2d at 573. 
236 See id.at 583-84 ("[T]he excessive bail clause works with the sufficient sure-
ties' clause to protect the interests of the prisoner in the interrelationship between 
the state, the prisoner, and the surety.").
237 384 S.W.3d at 208. 
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trial, any bail set that is more than necessary to secure that appear-
ance is excessive; thus, the excessive bail clause addresses judges' 
misuse of cash-only bail, not the sufficient sureties clause.238 
The court in Jackson further determined that a challenge to 
cash-only bail based on the defendant's inability to pay bail is a 
concern with the amount of bail set-that being bail's excessive-
ness-and not the form in which bail was set-that being bail's 
sufficiency as a surety. 239 Thus, while courts have conceded that the 
excessive bail clause and sufficient sureties' clause may work in 
conjunction with each other,240 a defendant's inability to post bail 
does not render bail excessive.241 Nor does cash-only bail automa-
tically violate the sufficient sureties clause if cash-only bail is found 
to violate the excessive bail clause. 242 However, the court in Jackson 
determined that setting bail higher than necessary to ensure the 
defendant's appearance at trial runs contrary to the presumption of 
innocence.243 The presumption of innocence has laid the foundation 
for a handful of states to differ from these eight states and find cash-
only bail unconstitutional.244 
238 See id. at 216. 
239 See id. at 216 (explaining that challenges to cash-only bail based on the 
defendant's inability to post bail are "a concern with the amount of bail, not with 
theform of bail permitted").
240 See Briggs, 666 N.W.2d at 583-84; see also Hornecker, 344 P.3d 771, 781 
(Wyo. 2015) (holding that the sufficient sureties' clause allows for a broad range 
of methods to ensure the defendant's presence at trial, including cash-only bail, 
and those methods are determined at the discretion of the trial court and subject to 
the prohibition against excessive bail).
241 See Jackson, 384 S.W.3d at 217 ("'Bail is not excessive merely because a 
defendant is unable to secure it."' (quoting Dabbs v. State, 489 S.W.2d 745, 748 
(Mo. App. 1972))); see also Foote, ConstitutionalCrisisin Bail, supra note 77, at 
993 ("[A]mere inability to procure bail in a certain amount does not of itself make 
such amount excessive."). 
242 See Briggs, 666 N.W.2d at 584 ("[I]t is conceivable that the use of cash-only 
bail could violate the excessive bail clause even though its use does not automatic-
ally violate the sufficient sureties clause."). 
243 See Jackson, 384 S.W.3d at 216 ("bail set higher than necessary to secure the 
defendant's appearance or to protect the public [] constitutes an impermissible 
punishment, contrary to the venerable presumption that a defendant is innocent 
until proven guilty"). 
244 See infra Section II.C.2. 
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2. Money is the Problem: States Ruling 
Cash-Only Bail Unconstitutional 
Contrary to the eight states upholding the constitutionality of 
cash-only bail,245 Idaho, 246 Louisiana,247 Minnesota,
248 Ohio,249 
Tennessee,250 Vermont,251 and Washington252 have held that cash-
only bail is not a sufficient surety and, thus, violates the Consensus 
Right to Bail Clause. These courts have held that cash-only bail 
operates as an effective denial of bail.253 For example, in Lewis Bail 
Bond Co. v. Gen. Sessions Court,254 the Tennessee Court of Appeals 
criticized the imposition of cash-only bail by analogizing to a judge 
imposing a real-estate-only bond.255 The Lewis court held that 
requiring a defendant to put up only real estate-a luxury not all 
defendants have-in order to obtain pretrial release would violate 
the Consensus Right to Bail Clause.256 The court in Lewis reasoned 
that defendants with no real estate-like those with no cash-are 
effectively denied a sufficient surety when they are required to post 
a real-estate-only or cash-only bond.257 Similarly, in State ex rel. 
245 See supra Section II.C.1. 
246 See Idaho Code § 19-2907(2) (2009) ("Although bail may be posited in the 
form of a cash deposit [] ... a defendant shall not be required to post bail in the 
form of a cash deposit."); see also Two Jinn, Inc. v. Dist. Court of the Fourth Judi-
cial Dist., 249 P.3d 840, 847 (Idaho 2011) (noting that Idaho's Constitution and 
Bail Act prohibits cash-only bail prior to conviction for noncapital offenses).
247 See State v. Golden, 546 So. 2d 501, 503 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
248 See State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 352-53 (Minn. 2000) (en banc). 
249 See State ex rel. Sylvester v. Neal, 14 N.E.3d 1024, 1032 (Ohio 2014). 
250 See Lewis Bail Bond Co. v. Gen. Sessions Court, No. C-97-62, 1997 WL 
711137, at *1, *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1997).
251 See State v. Hance, 910 A.2d 874, 881 (Vt. 2006). 
252 See State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 55 (Wash. 2014). 
253 See, e.g., Lewis, 1997 WL 711137, at *5; Hance, 910 A.2d at 881 ("[T]he 
imposition of cash only bail is, in effect, a denial of bail under circumstances that 
are not constitutionally permissible."). 
15' Lewis, 1997 WL 711137, at*1. 
255 See id. at *5. 
256 See id. 
257 See id. 
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Sylvester v. Neal,258 the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that 
cash-only bail operated as an effective denial of bail, pointing out 
the problem that only wealthy defendants would obtain pretrial 
release, while the indigent would remain incarcerated.259 
Further, these states have interpreted the plain language of 
"sufficient sureties" differently than those states allowing for cash-
260° 261only bail. For example, in State v. Barton, the Washington 
Supreme Court ruled that the Consensus Right to Bail Clause 
requires courts to allow the defendant, at minimum, an opportunity 
to post a surety bond in addition to any cash requirements.262 The 
court reasoned that because the history surrounding bail indicated 
that suretyship evolved out of third-party arrangements, access to a 
"surety" in the context of the Consensus Right to Bail Clause 
requires access to a third-party surety.263 The court qualified its 
holding, however, noting that judges are not required to give 
defendants an absolute right to make bail; instead, defendants must 
only be given an opportunity to post bail using a surety. 264 
In addition, court's ruling that cash-only bail is unconstitu-
tional have determined that the history of bail suggests bail's 
primary purpose is to protect defendants, not simply secure their 
251 14 N.E.3d 1024 (Ohio 2014).
259 Id. at 1033 ("When a court sets [cash-only] bail ... and does not allow the 
defendant to secure a surety bond as an alternative, it denies the constitutional 
right of the defendant to be bailable by sufficient sureties.").
260 Compare State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 55 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (finding that 
judges must allow defendants an opportunity to post a surety bond in addition to 
cash), with Trujillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Ark. 2016) (finding that cash is 
one of many broad methods to ensure a defendant's appearance at trial and is, 
therefore, a sufficient surety).
261 181 Wash. 2d at 148. 
262 See id. at 162. 
263 See id. at 162 ("Focusing on the plain language of [the sufficient sureties' 
clause] and reviewing the historical understanding of a surety at the time this 
language was adopted, we conclude ... that a defendant must be allowed the 
option of a surety arrangement in addition to the option of depositing cash or 
property."). 
264 See id. 
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appearance at trial.265 For example, in State v. Hance, the Ver-
mont Supreme Court engaged in a historical analysis, finding that 
bail both furthers defendants' liberty interests and ensures their 
presence at future court proceedings.267 While history recognized 
both interests, the court in Hance held that the sufficient sureties' 
clause primarily protects defendants' liberty interests and secon-
darily serves courts' interests in ensuring defendants' appearance at 
trial. 268 Further, because cash-only bail has the effect of detaining 
the accused before conviction-thereby depriving defendants of 
their freedom before conviction-the court in Hance held that cash-
only bail not only violates the sufficient sureties clause, but also 
undermines the presumption of innocence. 269 The Idaho Supreme 
Court similarly reasoned that cash-only bail fails to protect the 
accused from punishment before conviction. 
While these courts have acknowledged the competing 
purposes of bail-preserving the defendant's liberty interest before 
trial versus ensuring the defendant's appearance at trial and commu-
nal safety271 -these courts have also determined that there can be 
265 See State v. Hance, 910 A.2d 874, 878 (Vt. 2006) ("[H]istory indicates that 
constitutional bail provisions ...serve not only to ensure a defendant's future 
appearance, but also to protect the defendant from pretrial detention by providing a 
measure of flexibility in satisfying the court that he will appear as required.").
266 910 A.2d at 874. 
267 See id. at 879 (noting that bail "'acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommo-
date both the defendant's interest in pretrial liberty and society's interest in ensur-
ing the defendant's presence at trial."' (quoting Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., The Eighth 
Amendment and the Right to Bail: HistoricalPerspectives, 82 COLuM. L. REv. 
328, 329-30 (1982))). 
268 See Hance, 910 A.2d at 879 (describing the history of the sufficient sureties 
clause as "primarily"aimed at protecting a defendant's liberty interest and, con-
comitantly, serving the court's interest in having the defendant appear at trial") 
(emphasis added).
269 See id. at 879. 
271 See Two Jinn,Inc. v. Dist. Court of the Fourth Judicial Dist., 249 P.3d 840, 847 
(Idaho 2011) ("The purpose of bail is to prevent the punishment of innocent 
persons and at the same time compel the presence of the prisoner when required.").
271 See supra Section II.A; Section II.C. 1. 
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more than one purpose behind state constitutional provisions.272 For 
example, the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Brooks
273 
acknowledged bail as having multiple purposes.27 4 However, like 
the Vermont Supreme Court in Hance, the court in Brooks deter-
mined that bail serves the broader purpose of limiting the govern-
ment's power over the accused, as it provides protection for the 
accused's liberty interests against courts' interests in securing 
defendants' presence in court.275 Ultimately, these seven states have 
held that cash-only bail contradicts the sufficient sureties' language, 
the history of bail, the presumption of innocence, and the defen-
dant's liberty interest in pretrial release.276 Despite substantial case 
law on both sides of the issue, however, some states have declined 
to rule on cash-only bail's constitutionality as a sufficient surety.277 
272 See State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 55 (Wash. 2014) ("[T]here can be more than 
one purpose motivating a provision of the state constitution."); see also State v. 
Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 350 (Minn. 2000) (enbanc). 
273 604 N.W.2d at 345. 
274 See id. at 350 (noting that bail ensures the accused's appearance at trial and 
protects the accused's liberty interests).
275 See id. ("In essence, the clause limits government power to detain an accused 
prior to trial. The clause is intended to protect the accused rather than the courts."); 
see also State v. Hance, 910 A.2d 874, 878 (Vt. 2006) ("To construe the 'suffi-
cient sureties' clause as permitting cash-only bail would increase government 
power to engage in pretrial confinement, a result which cannot be reconciled with 
... [as] we have recognized the threat to individual liberty inherent in pretrial 
detention."); State ex rel Jones v. Hendon, 609 N.E.2d 541, 544 (Ohio 1993) 
("[T]he only apparent purpose in requiring 'cash only' bond to the exclusion of 
other forms of [bail] is to restrict the accused's access to a surety and, thus, to 
detain the accused in violation of [the sufficient sureties' clause.]").
276 Hance, 910 A.2d at 878 ("Our interpretation of the 'sufficient' sureties' clause 
should be consistent with our longstanding recognition that bail cannot be used for 
the purpose of pretrial detention.").
277 See infta Section 11.C.3. 
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3. The Other Stacks on Deck: Other States 
Confronted with the Constitutionality of 
Cash-Only Bail 
While a minority of states have addressed the constitu-
tionality of cash-only bail in the sufficient surety context, 278 four 
states have either expressly declined the invitation to make a ruling 
or have ruled in such a way as to leave the constitutionality of cash-
only bail undecided. 279 New York, for example, in People ex rel. 
McManus v. Horn,2 80 prohibited cash-only bail by holding that 
judges could not fix only one form of bail because the linguistic 
construction of New York's Criminal Procedure Law required at 
least two forms of bail for defendants. 281 The McManus decision did 
not explicitly rule on the constitutionality of cash-only bail, and the 
decision adds little to cash-only bail's jurisprudence. 282 The 
Montana Supreme Court in State v. Rodriguez283 also declined to 
decide whether cash-only bail is constitutional, rendering the issue 
278 See supraSections I.C. 1-2 (finding that fifteen states have ruled directly as to 
whether cash-only bail constitutes a sufficient surety).
279 See People ex rel. McManus v. Horn, 967 N.E.2d 671, 673 (N.Y. 2012); State v. 
Rodriguez, 628 P.2d 280, 284(Mont. 1981); State v. Henley, 363 P.3d 319, 328 
(Haw. 2015); Sneedv. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
280 967 N.E.2d at 671. 
281 See id. at 665-66 ("The court may direct that the bail be posted in any one of 
two or more of the forms specified in subdivision one, designated in the alterna-
tive, and may designate different amounts varying with the forms.") (emphasis 
added) (citing N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 520.10(2)(b) (McKinney 2006)).
282 See Horn, 967 N.E.2d at 673; see also Maureen Wynne, Note, McManus v. 
Horn: The Legality of Setting a Single Form of Bail, 29 TOuRO L. REv. 1537, 
1553-54 (2013) (suggesting that the McManus decision, by mandating that trial 
courts provide accused persons more than one form of bail, "can be just as 
restrictive as setting a single form of bail"). As Wynne indicates, under McManus, 
a trial court is required to set at least two forms of bail for the defendant. See id.at 
1552. However, the trial court may impose a $20,000 cash bail or a $200,000 
partially secured appearance bond, which would require the defendant to pay a 
10% deposit totaling $20,000. Id. Thus, despite the McManus decision, Wynne 
asks, "whether a choice between two unattainable bail forms is really a choice at 
all [?]" Id. at 1554. 
283 628 P.2d 280 (1981). 
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moot.2 84 The court in Rodriguez noted, however, that cash-only bail 
may violate the defendant's liberty interest and the presumption of 
innocence.285 Similarly, a Hawaii court noted the unfairness of 
imposing cash-only bail, but ultimately declined to hear the issue.
286 
Perhaps the closest decision to rule on cash-only bail without 
actually ruling as to its constitutionality is Sneed v. State, in which 
the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that cash-only bail was imper-
missible, but on other grounds not relating to cash-only bail's consti-
tutionality as a sufficient surety.287 The Sneed court held that the 
trial court abused its discretion by requiring the defendant to post a 
$25,000 cash-only bail. 288 The court in Sneed reasoned that because 
the defendant (1) was unable to post the entire $25,000 in cash; 
(2) was denied a surety option; and (3) was not determined to be a 
flight risk, the trial court had condemned the defendant to jail 
without reason. 289 Ultimately, the court in Sneed held that the trial 
court abused its discretion in setting cash-only bail 290 without 
referring to the sufficient sureties language, despite Indiana having 
such language in its constitution. 
291 
284 See id. at 284. While the Court did not precisely explain why the issue was 
rendered moot, it indicated that in the future, if a court sets a cash-bail, the court 
must make specific findings backing its decision. 
285 See id. (declining to rule on whether cash-only bail violates the sufficient 
sureties clause of Montana's state constitution, but finding that cash-only bail 
"may well deprive a person of his liberty before trial and clash with the presump-
tion of innocence").
286 State v. Henley, 363 P.3d 319, 329 (Haw. 2015) ("[T]his case highlights the 
unfairness in conditioning bail on payment in cash only."). The Hawaii Supreme 
Court denied hearing the issue of whether cash-only bail was constitutional 
because the defendant failed to raise the issue on appeal. See id. 
287 Sneedv. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
288 Id. at 1260. Sneed was charged with dealing methamphetamine. Id. at 1256. 
After the trial court denied both the defendant's motion to reduce bail and her 
request for a surety option, the defendant claimed that the set bail was excessive 
and that the trial court's bail effectively punished her before trial. Id at 1260.28 9 
_d at 1260. 
290 See id. at 1256-61 (refusing to render cash-only bail unconstitutional). 
291 See id. at 1260; Ind. Const. art. I, § 17 ("Offenses, other than murder or treason, 
shall be bailable by sufficient sureties."). 
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Overall, eight states have concluded that cash-only bail con-
stitutes a sufficient surety based on bail's history, its purpose, the 
intent of the framers, the severity of the offense, and public 
safety. 292 On the other hand, seven states have held cash-only bail 
violates states' sufficient sureties clauses, focusing on the defen-
dant's liberty interests.293 Notwithstanding these arguments, four 
states have declined to take sides on the direct issue,294 perhaps 
waiting for scholars and various justice initiative groups to propose 
more cost-efficient and practical alternatives.295 
D. Dreams Money Can Buy: Scholars and Justice 
Initiative Groups on Cash-Only Bail and 
Alternatives to the Money Bail System 
Many scholars and justice initiative groups have pointed out 
flaws with the money bail system, attributing part of the problem to 
judges setting high cash bails-or cash-only bail amounts-that 
defendants are unable to meet, thereby resulting in incarceration.296 
America's leaders have even called for reform, pointing to the nine 
billion dollar bill taxpayers have fronted to incarcerate defendants 
before trial.297 In light of the problems associated with the money 
bail system, bail scholars and justice initiative groups have proposed 
alternatives that neutralize the money bail system's effect on 
292 See supra Section I.C.1. 
293 See supra Section II.C.2. 
294 See cases cited supranote 279. 
295 See infra Section II.D. 
296 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1306 ("Judges often set money bail at an 
amount the defendant cannot afford."); Lester, supranote 31, at 20 ("A high bail 
should not be used as a method of pretrial detention."); Neil, supra note 9, at 13 
("[M]oney bail puts people without expendable income at risk of suffering the 
adverse impacts of detention."); Rabuy, supra note 8, at 1 ("With money bail, a 
defendant is required to pay a certain amount of money as pledged... [, and i]f he 
is unable to come up with the money[,] ... he can be incarcerated from his arrest 
until his case is resolved or dismissed in court."). 
297 See Holder, supranote 16, at 2 ("[Nlearly two thirds of all inmates who crowd 
our county jails-at an annual cost of roughly nine billion taxpayer dollars-are 
defendants awaiting trial."). 
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indigent defendants, including electronic monitoring and recogni-
zance bonds.298 While these alternatives seem both practical and 
cost efficient, proponents of the money bail system contend that 
these alternatives are flawed.299 Thus, some scholars have argued in 
favor of cash-only bail and have suggested that the money bail 
system serves bail's essential purpose-ensuring defendants' 
appearance at trial one way or another. 300 
1. Make It Rain (on the Poor): The Effects 
of the Money Bail System and the Conse-
quences of Failing to Post a Cash-Only 
Bail 
Strictly speaking, those unable to afford a cash-only bail 
have only one alternative: incarceration. 30 1 The effects of pretrial 
incarceration impacts defendants across all social strata, affecting 
their families, their psyche, and their liberty interests. 302 For exam-
ple, pretrial detention places burdens on defendants' financial and 
family situations.303 Because these defendants are incarcerated and 
unable to work, their families are deprived of financial and emo-
tional support. 304 The pressing need to provide support for their 
298 See, e.g., Rabuy, supranote 8, at 6-7 (recommending reducing the amount of 
arrests, stopping the criminalization of failing to pay fines or costs, and eliminating 
the money bail system altogether); Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1364 (advocating 
for the use of pretrial electronic monitoring in lieu of the money bail system); see 
also infra Sections II.D.2-3. 
299 See in~fa Section JJ.D.4. 
300 See id 
301 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1311 ("[F]ewer indicted offenders ...who 
have been granted bail are often unable to afford it. [...] [H]igh bail requirements 
make it very difficult for indicted defendants to obtain pretrial release."). 
302 See Standards, supranote 181 , § 10-1.1, at 36 ("Deprivation of liberty pending 
trial is harsh and oppressive, subjects defendants to economic and psychological 
hardship, interferes with their ability to defend themselves, and, in many instances, 
deprives their families of support."). 
303 See id; Neil, supranote 9, at 13-14. 
304 See Neil, supra note 9, at 13-14 (noting the impact that pretrial incarceration 
has on poor defendants and their families due to the detainee being unable to 
work); Appleman, supra note 12, at 1319-20, 1362 (noting the "emotional and 
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families-in addition to defendants' limited access to legal aid-
leads to these defendants either being convicted for lack of prepar-
edness or, worse yet, pleading guilty to avoid further incarcera-
tion. °5 Proponents of bail reform point out that the consequences of 
money bail punish the accused before conviction and contradict the 
presumption of innocence. 306 Of course, pretrial incarceration only 
occurs if a defendant is unable to post bond, or if a judge decides the 
defendant is too dangerous to be released into the community. 307 
Thus, while indigent defendants are those most likely to be unable to 
post even relatively low bail amounts, indigent defendants who are 
detained pretrial because of their inability to pay bail are treated as 
though they are a threat to the community all the same. 308 
economic hardships" that defendants' families suffered as a result of pretrial 
incarceration); Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1356-57. 
305 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1353-56 (noting pretrial detainees being more 
likely to be convicted than those released on bail); Wice, supra note 46, at 23 
(holding that because of the limited contact with their attorneys, pretrial detainees 
"are far more likely to be found guilty and receive more severe sentences than 
those released prior to trial"); Appleman, supranote 12, at 1320 ("The mere possi-
bility of pretrial imprisonment often compels defendants to plead guilty[, and] ... 
when confronted with an unaffordable bail, a large number of pretrial detainees 
simply plead guilty."); Lester, supranote 31, at 50 ("A person in jail is more likely 
to accept a plea bargain to end his time in jail, especially if probation is offered, 
than is a person who is out onbail."). 
306 See Lester, supranote 31, at 12-14 (emphasizing the importance of bail and the 
presumption of innocence in America's criminal justice system).
307 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1353. 
308 See id. (noting that low-level offenders are jailed with convicted and potentially 
dangerous defendants who await trial); John Eligon, Top State CourtSays Judges 
Can 'tDemandCash Only Bail,N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2012/03/23/nyregion/new-york-court-of-appeals-rules-judges-cant-limit-bail-
to-cash.html (referencing the negative effects that cash-only bail has on low-
income people) (last visited Feb. 2, 2017); see also Carlson, supranote 176, at 16. 
Carlson argues: 
[T]hose defendants who can afford the predetermined bail sum 
are released without judicial examination, while those who can-
not are detained. The dispositive difference between these par-
ticular populations is their access to money, not the risks they 
pose. Hinging pretrial liberty upon such a distinction raises 
issues of public safety as well as questions about the funda-
mental fairness of a pretrial release system based upon money. 
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2. Easy-E: Electronic Monitoring as an 
Alternative to Cash-Only Bail 
With the advancement in technology, one scholar has argued 
that electronic monitoring provides a feasible solution to the rising 
problem of indigent defendants being too poor to post a cash bail.309 
While electronic monitoring is often used in post-conviction situa-
tions,310 this scholar argues that electronic monitoring may provide a 
substitute that is at least as effective as cash bail without incarcera-
ting primarily indigent defendants. 311 Further, by continuing to 
supervise defendants before trial with an electronic monitoring 
device, this scholar argues that electronic monitoring ensures com-
munity safety at a cost much lower than pretrial detention.312 Pretrial 
release through electronic monitoring also allows defendants to 
adequately prepare and defend themselves if their cases go to trial 
and allows defendants to continue working to support their 
families.313 
Notwithstanding the benefits, the implementation of electro-
nic monitoring in the pretrial context has seen little growth.314 This 
is because electronic monitoring is primarily used post-conviction, 
Id. 
309 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1364-82. 
310 See id at 1365467 (noting types of electronic monitoring used before and after 
sentencing include tether-based programs, voice verification, GPS tracking, and 
home confinement).
311 See id at 1372 ("Technology might not be able to completely eliminated 
detention for flight risk, but it should be able to eliminate detention for poverty.").
312 See id at 1373 (noting electronic monitoring programs may range from $5 to 
$25 per day, whereas pretrial detention costs states between $50 to $123 per day); 
See id; See also Appleman, supra note 12, at 1362 ("Although [supervision] 
services do cost money, in the long term [] they end up saving far more taxpayer 
dollars, as it is far more expensive to imprison those indicted offenders waiting for 
trial than to supervise them electronically at home.").
313 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1364, 1372; Appleman, supra note 12, at 1362 
(arguing that electronic monitoring allows pretrial defendants to continue to sup-
port their families in spite of ongoing criminal proceedings).
314 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1374 (noting courts' hesitancy to implement 
electronic monitoring and admitting that "[e]mpirically, the cost savings of moni-
toring in lieu of detention require further detailed investigation''). 
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and the number of pretrial electronic monitoring studies and their 
results remain small and inconclusive. 15 Also, defendants' con-
tinued incentive to flee may be one reason why courts believe 
electronic monitoring is less effective. 16 For example, those given 
pretrial release through electronic monitoring still tamper with their 
monitoring devices and abscond. 7 One scholar contends, however, 
that additional penalties and criminal sanctions for such tampering 
adequately deter defendants from fleeing or interfering with their 
devices.318 
3. Recognize This: Recognizance and 
Conditional Bonds' Feasibility 
Various justice initiative groups and scholars also argue that 
releasing defendants on their own recognizance provides judiciaries 
with an effective way of ensuring the defendants' presence at trial 
without imposing onerous financial requirements to post bail.31 9 In 
deciding an individual's risk of flight and potential danger to the 
community, these groups advocate for judges to use risk assess-
ments and consider defendants' personal characteristics that may 
315 See id. at 1368, 1371 (noting that electronic monitoring may be at least as 
effective as money bail, but whether electronic monitoring is more effective than 
money bail is inconclusive). 
316 See id. at 1371-80 (noting other problems with electronic monitoring, 
including defendants tampering with devices, the costs, privacy concerns, and the 
incentive to flee without losing money.
317 See id. at 1371. 
318 See id at 1371-72 ("These concerns ... can also be addressed by imposing 
higher penalties for failing to appear while monitored or for tampering with a 
monitoring device."). 
319 See Neil, supra note 9, at 31 ("[T]here is a large proportion of people accused 
of offenses that can be released on their own recognizance and trusted to comply 
with pretrial requirements of attending court and avoiding re-arrest."); Johnson, 
supranote 32, at 199 (indicating that recognizance bonds may provide an alterna-
tive to low-risk, poor defendants). 
320 See Rabuy, supra note 8, at 29 (defining risk assessments as "tools that, when 
used properly, can provide a dependable prediction of whether a person will be 
involved in pretrial misconduct, whether by failure to appear in court or being a 
danger to the community"); Neil, supranote 9,at 43 (indicating that the use of risk 
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make them more or less of a flight risk.321 These factors-including 
defendants' family and communal ties, employment status, records 
of defendants' past court appearances, and financial resources-may 
provide accurate assessments as to defendants' flight risk.3 22 These 
factors may also work as a natural deterrent that ensures defendants 
do not flee.323 Moreover, scholars argue that judges' ability to 
impose court-ordered conditions, such as drug testing, becoming 
gainfully employed, pursing educational opportunities, or curfews, 
ensures defendants' continued incentive to be law-abiding and 
appear for future court dates.324 Court notification systems have also 
been suggested to remind defendants of court dates and locations to 
help defendants appear in court.325 
On the other hand, many of the same advocates of recogni-
zance bonds, risk assessments, and conditional release at the pretrial 
stage acknowledge the drawbacks of these alternatives.326 For exam-
ple, a study conducted between 1990 and 2004 showed that almost 
half of the felony defendants who failed to appear in court were 
assessments "provide for informed bail decisions and support judicial officers in 
having a reliable, bias-free opinion driving his or her determination").
321 See Neil, supra note 9, at 30. Neil argues that because people rating higher on 
risk assessments are generally not released on their recognizance, unsecured 
recognizance bonds will be reserved for low-risk offenders. See id.at 31.322 See id. at 30-31. 
323 See Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supranote 124, at 973 (noting the 
need for financial conditions in setting bail is unwarranted, as natural deterrents 
like employment and personal relationships provide defendants with sufficient 
incentive not to flee). 
324 See Johnson, supra note 32, at 199; Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1363 
(explaining that court-ordered conditions and pretrial supervised release programs, 
when coupled with recognizance bonds, are highly effective and have become the 
preferred option for many bail reform advocates). However, proponents of court-
ordered conditions argue that the conditions must match the defendant's needs, 
otherwise, these defendants will end up back in custody. See Neil, supranote 9, at 
32 ("Placing inappropriate or unnecessary conditions on people with low risk 
ratings... results in higher failure rates."). 
325 See Neil, supranote 9, at 32-33 (proposing court notification systems to offset 
the most common reasons for missing court, including forgetfulness, work, or 
being in the wrong court room). 
326 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1363 (" [R]elease on personal recognizance ... 
is, unsurprisingly, less effective in securing presence at trial."). 
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Vols. 36-37 
those released on their own recognizance.327 In fact, at least one 
scholar has pointed out that indigent defendants' lack of financial 
resources may be one of the reasons why indigent defendants are 
more of a flight risk in failing to appear in court. 328 Moreover, one 
justice initiative group has identified some flaws with using risk 
assessments, noting that using factors like family and community 
background are unrelated to pretrial conduct and may not provide 
accurate risk assessments for all defendants.3 29 Court-ordered 
conditions also have their own cost implications, as these conditions 
require courts to expend more judicial resources, including pretrial 
supervision, which increases the burden on taxpayers. 330 
4. Don't Shake the Money Maker!: The 
Benefits of Cash-Only Bail and the 
Money Bail System 
While the arguments providing solutions to the money bail 
system and its effect on the indigent seem sensible, there are argu-
ments in favor of cash-only bail and the money bail system as a 
whole. 331 For example, scholars are concerned that setting up 
individualized bail proceedings that weigh all the defendant's 
relevant characteristics would be time-consuming, costly, and more 
327 See id. at 1363 n.84 (finding that out of 54,485 felony defendants who failed to 
appear in court, 20,883 were released on their own recognizance). 
328 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1385 ("[D]efenders of the bail system [may] be 
able to argue that the same lack of resources that prevents the poor from obtaining 
release makes them less likely to fear the repercussions of failing to appear for 
trial."). 
329 See Rabuy, supra note 8, at 4 n.17. Also, because risk assessments vary by 
jurisdiction, there is a chance that using these tools could actually increase existing 
disparities in the criminal justice system between the affluent and the indigent. See 
id. 
330 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1363 (noting that pretrial supervision pro-
grams, while highly beneficial, can be highly expensive). 
331 See Van De Veer, supranote 35, at 848, 874-77; see also Wiseman, supranote 
15, at 1398 (noting the profits that commercial bail bondsmen obtained under the 
current regime, dubbing it "a multi-billion dollar industry"). 
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difficult.3 2 Also, one scholar has argued that cash-only bail is an 
efficient method of ensuring defendants' appearance in court and 
keeping the dockets clear.333 This efficiency occurs because cash 
bail incentivizes defendants to appear in court so that they may 
retain their bail money. 334 
Further, cash-only bail may actually lower judicial costs. 335 
If accused are able to secure pretrial release without posting a cash-
only bail and are subsequently arrested for new offenses, then the 
additional charges will increase taxpayer costs. 336 These additional 
criminal charges would also clutter the court dockets. 37 Instead, 
scholars argue that individuals released on cash-only bonds are more 
likely to refrain from crime and appear in court out of fear of losing 
their bail money. 338 
Ultimately, setting bail can be a difficult decision for a 
judge, as the different factors and circumstances making up a 
judge's decision may counteract one another.3 39 Although a defen-
dant's danger to the community and risk of flight may be relatively 
low, bail schedules and pressures to be "tough on crime" lead to 
332 See Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 975 ("Admit-
tedly, the setting of individualized [bail] conditions poses a more difficult problem 
than the automatic imposition of bail."); see also Rabuy, supra note 8, at 4 n.17 
(noting the challenges that come with using risk assessments, including the lack of 
uniformity among jurisdictions that use risk assessments and their questionable 
accuracy). 
...See Van De Veer, supranote 35, at 848, 876-77. Van De Veer goes on explain 
that the "cash-only bail requirement is also needed to counteract the reduced effec-
tiveness of surety bonds caused by growing failure to honor misdemeanor war-
rants." Id.at 876-77. 
331 See id. at 876-77 (arguing that even if the defendant's family posts the 
defendant's bond, these family members still "tend to make sure the defendant 
appears in court"); see also Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1365, 1371 (pointing out 
that, for obvious reasons, pretrial detention is the only 100% effective method to 
ensure the defendant's appearance at trial).
335 See VanDe Veer, supranote 35, at 863. 
336 See id. 
337 See id. 
338 See id. at 876-77. See also Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1371 (noting that 
electronic monitoring, recognizance bonds, and other unsecured bonds fail to pro-
vide released pretrial defendants with the necessary incentive to return to court).
339 See supra Section H.A. 
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judges ignoring defendants' ability to pay a particularly high bail 
amount.3 40 The split of authority among the states addressing cash-
only bail's constitutionality can be reduced to the different interpre-
tations of "sufficient sureties" based on the history, text, and 
purpose of the Consensus Right to Bail Clause.341 Scholars' and 
justice initiative groups' solutions scratch the surface on how to 
counteract the money bail system's effect on the poor, but electronic 
monitoring, unsecured bonds, and recognizance releases have their 
strengths and weaknesses.3 42 Nevertheless, understanding cash-only 
bail as a systemic problem and recognizing the state courts' over-
sight of the current system's discrimination against the poor-a 
group highly represented in the criminal justice system343 _is 
imperative towards creating a feasible solution to cash-only bail.344 
III. NO MONEY, MORE PROBLEMS: CASH-
ONLY BAIL'S EFFECT ON THE INDIGENT 
AND ALTERNATIVES TO THE MONEY 
BAIL SYSTEM 
State courts use a variety of interpretative tools to answer 
whether cash-only bail is constitutional, including the purpose of 
bail, the framers' intent, and the textual meaning of the Consensus 
Right to Bail Clause. 45 The use of these tools, however, fails to 
address the looming problem of cash-only bail-its effect on indi-
gent criminal defendants, society, and the criminal justice system. 46 
Cash-only bail can lead to negative consequences, including false 
340 See Lester, supranote 31, at 25-26; Wice, supranote 48, at 15, 25. 
341 See supra Sections 11.C. 1-2. 
342 See supra Sections II.D.2-3. 
313See Holder, supra note 16, at 2 ("[A] disproportionate number of [pretrial 
detainees] are poor. They are forced to remain in custody-for an average of two 
weeks ... because they cannot afford to post the bail required-vely often, just a 
few hundred dollars."). 
311 See infraPart III. 
315 See supra Section II.C. 
346 See Neil, supra note 9, at 3 ("The vaguely understood pretrial process of bail 
costs the taxpayers of the United States billions of dollars and infringes on the 
liberty and rights of millions of Americans each year."). 
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convictions, 347 lost wages and family breakdowns, 348 and the 
increased cost on taxpayers. 49 Ultimately, other than guaranteeing 
an indigent defendant's presence at trial-through incarceration-
cash-only bail fails to further the goals of bails. 50 Such money bail 
fails to accurately assess a defendant's dangerousness and supplants 
the presumption of innocence by detaining defendants before con-
viction based solely on their financial status.351 
Moreover, while cash-only bail may be a "sufficient surety" 
for some, it is not "sufficient" for low-income people who do not 
have the financial resources to post bail.352 Although the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984 has allowed courts to consider defendants' dan-
ger to the community, or lack thereof, when setting bail, 353 courts 
should leave behind the abusive practice of using defendants' 
financial status as a proxy for pretrial incarceration. 54 Further, 
because most courts do not assess defendants' income or ability 
make bail,35 5 cash-only bail should only be used sparingly-like in 
117 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1305 (noting that impoverished defendants 
plead guilty, even if innocent, to avoid further pretrial detention).
348 See Neil, supra note 9, at 13-14; see also Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1361 
(" [M]oney bail and the high pretrial detention rates associated with this antiquated 
system impose high burdens on defendants, families, and society.").
319 See Leon Neyfakh, IsBail Unconstitutional?: Our Broken System Keeps the 
Poorin JailandLets the Rich Walk Free, SLATE (June 30, 2015, 7:49 PM), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/crime/2015/06/is-bail-unconstitutional 
our broken system keeps thepoor injail and lets.html ("Detention should 
be based on objective evidentiaiy factors, like whether the person is a danger to 
the community or a flight risk-not how much money's in their pocket.").
350 See supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text (outlining the overarching 
goals of bail).
351 See Lester, supranote 31, at 12-14. 
352 See Lewis Bail Bond Co. v. Gen. Sessions Court, No. C-97-62, 1997 WL 
711137, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1997) (noting the effect of cash-only bail 
on those with a lack of financial resources).
313See sources cited supranote 138 and accompanying text. 
311 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1311 (noting that imposing high money bail 
"make [s] it very difficult for poor defendants to obtain pretrial release, despite the 
fact that the vast majority of these offenders have been arrested for low-level, 
nonviolent offenses"). 
311 See Lester, supranote 31, at 25 ("[A] court cannot set a reasonable bail for a 
particular defendant if it makes no inquiry as to how much bail a particular defen-
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Trujio 356 and Gutierrez357 for example, both of which were serious 
cases involving violent crimes-and only upon careful considera-
tion.358 
In fact, cash-only bail should be used as the Manhattan Bail 
Reform Project and the Bail Reform Acts of 1966 and 1984 origin-
ally intended secured bonds to be used: only if a defendant's release 
on recognizance would not likely ensure his presence at trial and 
only for those defendants most susceptible to flight, violence, or 
recidivism. 359 Also, the addition of electronic monitoring gives 
judges a novel alternative to cash bonds that were not available 
during the earlier periods of bail reform.360 Alternatives like these do 
not deplete defendants' or taxpayers' pockets. 361 Further, the 
remaining states whose courts have not yet decided cash-only bail's 
constitutionality should carefully consider the effects of their 
decisions-particularly on the indigent-while also considering 
alternatives to cash-only bail.362 
dant can afford."); see also Wice, supra note 48, at 14 (finding that a defendant's 
ability to pay bail is often the least explored aspect of a bail proceeding). 
356 483 S.W.3d 801 (Ark. 2016). 
357 140 P.3d 1106 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). 
358 See id. at 162 ("Cash-only bail is the last option and should only be imposed 
after careful consideration."). 
359 See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 10 (describing the reasoning behind the Man-
hattan Bail Reform Project as showing judges many defendants can be released on 
their own recognizance); Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 
(repealed 1983) (favoring release on recognizance unless accused is a flight risk); 
Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (favoring release on recognizance 
unless accused is a flight risk or danger to community). 
360 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1344 (advocating for the use of electronic 
monitoring in the pretrial context and arguing that electronic monitoring may be as 
effective as the money bail and surety system). 
361 See id. at 1357, 1361, 1363-64 (describing the burdens that the money bail 
system places on indigent defendants and the cost to American taxpayers). 
362 See infJa Section III.C. 
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A. Money Ain't the Only Thing: Leaving Abusive 
Bail Practices Behind and Recognizing a Right 
to Make Bail 
The abusive practice of judges setting extraordinarily high 
bail amounts to keep defendants behind bars-whether to ensure 
their presence in court, to protect the community, or because of 
political pressures-dates as far back as the Norman Conquest and 
has continued even today.363 Reform efforts throughout English and 
American history have attempted to combat this abuse of power,364 
but cash-only bail seemingly represents the most recent method of 
judges imprisoning criminal defendants prior to trial.365 Throughout 
history, bail has changed to provide a general right to bail in 
noncapital cases, 366 provide habeas protection against long delays 
between arrest and trial,367 and protect against excessive bail.368 
However, with the recent controversy over cash-only bail,369 the 
divide on cash-only bail's constitutionality has become increasingly 
363 See Carbone, supra note 56, at 533 (noting the frequency by which judges 
throughout the history of bail set high bails that accused were unable to obtain); 
Hegreness, supra note 70, at 919 (pointing out judges' abusive practice of setting 
high bail amounts to detain defendants indefinitely before the passage of the 
English Bill of Rights); see also Wice, supranote 48, at 15, 25 (noting that outside 
pressures from the general public may influence judge's decision in setting bail). 
364 See generally Statute of Westminster 1275, 3 Edw. 1 c. 15 (Eng.); English Bill 
of Rights of 1689, 1 W. & M. Session 2 c. 2 (Eng.); Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (repealed 1983). 
365 See State ex rel Jones v. Hendon, 609 N.E.2d 541, 544 (Ohio 1993) (ruling that 
cash-only bail's only purpose is to restrict access to a surety and detain the 
accused). 
366 See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 5; see also Hegreness, supra note 70, at 927-
30. 
367 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended.").
368 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required."). 
369 See State v. Jackson, 384 S.W.3d 208, 212 (Mo. 2012) ("Although the 
sufficient sureties provision has been in effect in many states for almost 200 years, 
cases addressing its meaning do not appear to have arisen until the last few 
decades."). 
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more important to combat judges setting cash-only bail amounts that 
overwhelmingly incarcerate poor defendants. 
70 
The current protections and features of bail fail to provide an 
adequate remedy for poor defendants challenging their cash-only 
bail amounts.3 71 For example, the protection against excessive bail 
hinges on bail's reasonableness to both ensure the defendant's 
appearance at trial372 and guarantee the safety of others. 373 States' 
excessive bail clauses, however, do not consider a defendant's finan-
cial status or ability to make bail. 74 Therefore, courts should allow 
pretrial defendants to make challenges to cash-only bail under their 
states' excessive bail clauses and thereby abandon the practice of 
ignoring an individual's inability to afford bail. 75 Further, when 
such challenges arise, courts should consider a defendant's actual 
ability to post the bail the defendant received. 76 By allowing exces-
sive bail claims to move forward when defendants challenge cash-
only bail, and if courts analyze each individual's ability to pay the 
bail that is set, indigent defendants will be protected from unattain-
able cash-only bonds even as low as $500. 377 
371 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1305-06, 1310-11 (indicating the effect high 
bail requirements has on the indigent). See also supraSection II.C; Section II.D. 1. 
371 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1353 ("Money bail is increasingly not an 
alternative to pretrial detention but rather an enabler of the practice."). 
372 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) ("Bail set at a figure higher than an 
amount reasonably calculated to [assure the accused's presence] is 'excessive' 
under the Eighth Amendment."); Jackson, 384 S.W.3d at 216 (describing bail that 
is more than necessary to secure the defendant's appearance is excessive).
373 See State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 584 (Iowa 2003). 
374 See Foote, Constitutional Crisis in Bail, supra note 77, at 993 ("[A] mere 
inability to procure bail in a certain amount does not of itself make such amount 
excessive."); see also Lester, supranote 31, at 27 ("Just because bail is set at an 
amount that a defendant cannot afford does not mean it is per se excessive.").
375 See Wice, supranote 48, at 14 (noting that a defendant's ability to post a cash 
bail is often least explored by judges when setting bail). 
376 See id. 
377 See Rabuy, supranote 8, at 1 n.9 (indicating that when bail was set at less than 
$500, a majority of New York City residents still could not afford bail); Bail: An 
Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 975-77 (advocating for the use 
of individualized bail determinations). 
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While courts and scholars alike have determined that a 
defendant's inability to post bail does not itself render bail exces-
sive,378 other courts have recognized that cash-only bail may violate 
states' excessive bail clauses.3 79 Therefore, reviewing courts should 
not be deterred from using excessiveness to strike down a defen-
dant's unattainable cash-only bail.3 80 Like the Indiana Court of 
Appeals recognized in Sneed, defendants who are unable to post 
cash-only bail, and who are neither a flight risk nor a danger to the 
community, should not be condemned to jail without reason.3 81 The 
trial court's arbitrary decision in Sneed constituted an abuse of dis-
cretion.382 Thus, whereas the right to bail is limited,383 so too should 
a judge's discretion in setting bail be limited. 84 
Further, with cash bail becoming even more prevalent, and 
because cash-only bail is a state constitutional issue,385 a thorough 
review of the money bail system at the state level is necessary to 
achieve reform. 86 The Supreme Court's decisions in Stack, Carlson, 
and Salerno caused immense debate about whether a right to bail 
378 See supranote 241 and accompanying text. 
179 See supranotes 240-242 and accompanying text 
380 See Briggs, 666 N.W.2d at 584 (noting that the use of cash-only bail could 
violate the excessive bail clause without violating the sufficient sureties clause).
381 See Sneedv. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 
382 See id. at 1256-61 (holding that the trial court abused its discretion rather than 
rendering cash-only bail unconstitutional).
383 See Schnacke, supranote 13, at 9 (indicating bail as a fundamental, but limited 
right). 
384 See, e.g., Lewis Bail Bond Co. v. Gen. Sessions Court, No. C-97-62, 1997 WL 
711137, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1997) (finding that a judge's discretion in 
determining bail and conditions of release is limited to the factors set out in state 
statutes); see also State ex rel. Sylvester v. Neal, 14 N.E.3d 1024, 1032-33 (Ohio 
2014) (holding that, notwithstanding the trial court's discretion in setting bail, 
requiring cash-only bail restricts the accused's access to a surety in violation of 
Ohio's sufficient sureties' clause). 
385 See State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 55 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (describing cash-
only bail as a state constitutional question). 
386 See Bail:An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supranote 124, at 973 (addressing 
the need for a thorough review of bail and arguing for the judges to abandon the 
assumption that financial conditions are necessary in setting bail). 
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actually exists. 387 These decisions require that criminal defendants 
be given a reasonable opportunity to make bail. 388 However, it is 
ultimately up to state courts to interpret their sufficient sureties' 
clause in a way that provides defendants accused of noncapital 
offenses with this opportunity to make bail. 89 In doing so, courts 
reviewing challenges to cash-only bail should look beyond its 
history and purposes.3 90 Recognizing that cash-only bail fails to 
provide indigent defendants with an opportunity to make bail-and 
therefore does not constitute a sufficient surety for poor defendants 
seeking pretrial release-is necessary for implementing solutions.391 
387 Compare Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (describing a defendant's right 
to bail as unequivocal), Foote, ConstitutionalCrisis in Bail,supranote 77, at 969-
89 (arguing that a right to bail is implied in the Constitution), Hegreness, supra 
note 70, at 915-16 (inviting the Supreme Court to revisit Salerno and "recognize 
the centrality of bail to the constitutional history of the states and to protect it 
under the Fourteenth Amendment), and Lester, supra note 31, at 1-2, 14-15 
(indicating defendants have a right to bail to ensure their presumption of inno-
cence), with Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952) (rejecting any absolute 
right to bail from the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail Clause and holding 
"the very language of the [Eighth] Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bail-
able"), and United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754-55 (1987) ("The Court in 
Stack had no occasion to consider whether the Excessive Bail Clause requires 
courts to admit all defendants to bail."). 
388 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 10 (Jackson, J., concurring); see generallysources cited 
supra note 387 (acknowledging or conceding to defendants' right to a reasonable 
opportunity to make bail). Such an opportunity to post bail or alternative to cash-
only bail could also be in the form of a surety arraignment between the defendant 
and a third-party. See Barton, 181 Wash. 2d at 156-58, 162; Sylvester, 14 N.E.3d 
at 1033. 
389 See, e.g., State v. Briggs 666 N.W.2d 573, 582 (Iowa 2003) (ruling that suffi-
cient surety language created a right to access a surety in some form, but not any 
formwithout limit). 
390 See supraSections I.C.1-2 (indicating that courts look to the history, purpose, 
and intent of the framers when analyzing cash-only bail under the sufficient 
sureties clause). 
391 See State ex rel. Sylvester v. Neal, 14 N.E.3d 1024, 1032-33 (Ohio 2014) 
(noting that cash-only bail only allows the wealthy to obtain pretrial release, while 
the poor continued to be detained). 
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Further, allowing defendants access to more than one form of surety 
may close the gap in pretrial detention based on wealth disparity.392 
B. Money on States' Mind: The Need for States to 
Address the Bigger Picture 
Currently, state courts and trial judges use bail schedules and 
money bail to standardize and expedite the bail-setting process. 393 
Bail schedules and money bail also seek to increase courtroom 
efficiency by keeping dockets clear and preventing defendants from 
missing court. 94 The result of such practices, however, has led to 
many poor defendants awaiting trial from a jail cell instead of being 
with their families, working, or preparing their criminal cases. 395 
The cost to the taxpayers alone should be enough incentive for the 
government and voters alike to work towards a better solution.396 
Since bail is meant to protect the presumption of innocence, state 
courts deciding cash-only bail's constitutionality should consider its 
effect on the indigent and move for a more individualized bail 
process.3 97 Without an individualized inquiry into defendants' abil-
392 See Rabuy, supra note 8, at 1 n.9 (noting that 60% of pretrial detainees fall 
within the poorest one-third of Americans and 80% fall within the bottom one-half 
of the poverty scale); see also People ex rel. McManus v. Horn, 18 N.Y.3d 660, 
675 (2012) (prohibiting case-only bail and holding judges may not fix only one 
form of bail).
393 See Neil, supra note 9, at 22-23 (describing bail schedules as an attempt to 
standardize bail proceedings); see also Carlson, supra note 176, at 13-14, 16-17 
(pointing out bail schedules' flaws and the risks they pose to poor defendants).
391 See Van De Veer, supranote 35, at 876-77 (noting the increased efficiency of 
courts when cash-only bail is imposed).
395 See Neil, supranote 9, at 3, 13-14. 
396 See Holder, supra note 16, at 2 (estimating the cost of pretrial detain to tax-
payers at nine billion dollars per year).
397 See Bail:An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supranote 124, at 974 ("To estab-
lish a system of pretrial release which will accommodate the presumption of inno-
cence and the desire to secure the attendance of the accused at trial, a thorough-
going revision of other practices and assumptions is necessary."). 
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ity to make bail, bail schedules and cash-only bail will continue to 
lead to indigent defendants' detention rather than release.398 
To solve the problems the money bail system has created, 
judges should first steer clear of bail schedules.399 Instead, courts 
should weigh all the appropriate factors and interests when setting 
bail 400 and determine bail on an individualized basis. 40 1 Proponents 
of the current money bail system believe that the use of bail sche-
dules and cash-only bail increases efficiency within the courts, 
which are often flooded due to defendants jumping bail.40 2 These 
proponents, therefore, believe cash-only bail saves time, money, and 
judicial resources. 403 However, the current spending and costs to 
incarcerate pretrial detainees cost more than the profits gained 
through the use of bail schedules and cash-only bail.40 4 An indivi-
dualized inquiry, on the other hand, more accurately assesses defen-
dants' dangerousness to the community and likelihood of appearing 
in court, which protects defendants from pretrial incarceration and 
saves defendants and taxpayers more money.405 
Next, courts must recognize that ensuring a defendant's 
presence at trial or retaining judicial discretion in setting bail are not 
398 See Lester, supranote 31, at 26 ("The result [of bail schedules] is a 'going rate' 
for bail at the initial appearance and an inadequate examination of the defendant's 
ability to pay. As a consequence, defendants may be unnecessarily and unconstitu-
tionally incarcerated. This is especially true of indigent defendants.").
399 See Standards,supranote 181 § 10-5.3(e) cmt. at 113. The American Bar Asso-
ciation has expressly rejected the use of bail schedules, indicating, "[t]he practice 
of using bail schedules leads inevitably to the detention of some persons who 
would be good risks but are simply too poor to post the amount of bail required by 
the bail schedule." Id. 
400 See supranotes 169-175 and accompanying text. 
401 See Standards, supra note 181, § 10-5.3(e) cmt. at 113 (emphasizing "the 
importance of setting financial conditions through a process that takes account of 
circumstances of the individual defendant").
402 See VanDe Veer, supranote 35, at 863. 
403 See id. at 848, 863, 876-77 (noting the increase costs to the criminal justice 
system due to bail jumping and proposing cash-only bail as a solution).
404 Carlson, supra note 176, at 16-17 (noting the costs associated with judges 
using bail schedules); see also Holder, supranote 16, at 2. 
405 See Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supranote 124, at 973-77 (arguing 
for an individualized bail-setting process). 
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the only purposes of bail, as defendants' liberty interests must also 
6be considered.4 ° A judge's discretion to set bail has stood since 
colonial America,4 °7 and, by interpreting the Consensus Right to 
Bail Clause broadly, courts have held that cash-only bail is one of 
many discretionary methods constituting a sufficient surety.4° 8 How-
ever, no amount of judicial discretion should trump an accused's 
right to the presumption innocent before conviction.409 In order to 
address cash-only bail's constitutionality, states have resorted to 
technical, interpretative tools instead of looking at its discriminatory 
effect. 4 10 Recognizing cash-only bail's disparate impact on indigent 
defendants and focusing on defendants' financial ability to make 
bail is crucial for courts to adequately analyze cash-only chal-
lenges.411 
It is important for courts to consider the nature and serious-
ness of the offense when setting bail, even with cash-only bail, as 
trial courts absolutely must consider the seriousness of the charged 
offense when determining the amount and form of bail.412 However, 
cash-only bail should be reserved for the truly dangerous defen-
dants, rather than those nonviolent, indigent defendants unable to 
406 See State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 350, 352-54 (Minn. 2000) (en banc) 
(indicating that the primary purpose of bail is to protect the accused's liberty 
interest and that cash-only bail fails to further that interest).
407 See Foote, supra note 77, at 968 (indicating that among the elements the 
framers took from English Parliament with respect to bail was the distinction 
between bailable offenses, nonbailable offenses, and those offenses left to the 
discretion of the judges who determine a defendant's ability to make bail). 
408 See Trujillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Ark. 2016); State v. Briggs, 666 
N.W.2d 573, 582 (Iowa 2003). 
409 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (noting the importance of maintaining 
access to bail to uphold the presumption of innocence).
410 See supra Section II.C; Section II.D. 1. 
411 See State ex rel Jones v. Hendon, 609 N.E.2d 541, 544 (Ohio 1993); see also 
Trujillo, 483 S.W.3d at 809 (Brill, C.J., dissenting) (noting the effect of cash-only 
bail on those of low-income).
412 See Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 974; see also 
Lester, supranote 31, at 23; Lester, supranote 31, at 23. 
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pay low cash-only bail amounts. 413 Trial courts should also exhaust 
other alternatives to cash-only bail first, and use cash-only bail only 
as a last resort.414 This allows judges to retain their discretion in 
determining bail while ensuring that they only use cash-only bail 
when the situation calls for it.
415 
Although cash-only bail incentivizes individuals able to post 
bail, appear in court, and recuperate their bail money, cash-only bail 
fails to reach those indigent defendants who lack the financial 
resources to post bail in the first place. 416 Because bail seeks to 
ensure defendants' appearance at trial, proponents of cash-only bail 
argue that cash-only bail not only makes defendants' appearances 
more likely, but also creates a financial incentive for defendants to 
appear by retaining their bail money.417 However, this argument 
unravels when the bulk of the system's subjects do not have the 
money to trigger the incentive.41 8 If defendants cannot scrape 
together enough money to post bond, then the incentive to appear in 
court disappears, and courts are left with overcrowded jails and 
detention centers. 419 Thus, eliminating this incentive-driven program 
requires courts to shift their focus away from money and mass incar-
413 See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106, 1111 (N.M.2006) (murder and 
manslaughter charges); Trujillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 801 (Ark. 2016) (assault 
and battery charges). 
414 See Gutierrez, 140 P.3d at 1111 (cautioning trial judges in exercising their 
discretion when setting bail and impose cash-only bail as a last resort). 
415 See id.; see also State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 582 (Iowa 2003) (noting the 
importance ofjudges using their discretion when setting bail).
416 See Neil, supranote 9, at 13-15 (describing cash bail's effect on the indigent). 
417 See Van De Veer, supra note 35, at 876-77 (noting cash bail keeps defendants 
from fleeing and incentivizes them to appear in court); Fragoso v. Fell, 111 P.3d 
1027, 1032-33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (finding cash-only bail constitutional as a 
means of ensuring defendants' presence in court); Briggs, 666 N.W.2d at 581-85 
(indicating cash-only bail achieves the purpose of securing the accused's presence 
at trial). 
418 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1310-12 (noting that a large portion of jail 
populations consist of pretrial defendants unable to post bail and that states are 
"[i]ncarcerating poor defendants for nonfelony offenses"). 
419 See id. at 1301; Wice, supranote 48, at 22 (noting the extent of jail and prison 
overcrowding). 
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ceration and towards preserving innocence, preventing punishment 
before conviction, and freedom.42 ° 
Despite cash-only bail's deficiencies, proponents of cash-
only bail and the current system stand firm.421 These proponents 
argue that imposing cash-only bail is a reasonable means of not only 
ensuring the defendant's appearance in court, but also securing the424 
safety of the community. 4 22 Cases like Truji[[o423 and Gutierrez, 
may lead courts to determine that cash-only bail is constitutional 
simply because the interest in community safety and securing defen-
dants' presence at trial outweighs defendants' liberty interests in 
pretrial release. 425 However, these cases should be the exception, not 
the rule.426 The defendant in Trujillo battered his pregnant girlfriend 
and her son.427 The defendant in Gutierrez was indicted on multiple 
counts of murder and manslaughter.428 While these courts had legiti-
mate concerns of the defendants' potential dangerousness to the 
community. 429 most pretrial detainees are nonviolent. 430 For exam-
420 See Bail:An Ancient PracticeReexamined,supra note 124, at 969-70 (empha-
sizing the importance of the presumption of innocence in America's criminal 
justice system); State v. Rodriguez, 628 P.2d 280, 284 (Mont. 1981) (acknowl-
edging that cash-only bail "may well deprive a person of his liberty before trial 
and clash with the presumption of innocence"); Two Jinn, Inc. v. Dist. Court of the 
Fourth Judicial Dist., 249 P.3d 840, 847 (Idaho 2011) (describing bail as having 
two purposes: "to prevent the punishment of innocent persons and at the same 
time compel the presence of the prisoner when required"). 
421 See, e.g., Van De Veer, supra note 35, at 848, 876-77 (proposing that 
increasing the use of cash-only bail may help ameliorate the harms caused by out-
standing warrants and defendants' failure to honor those warrants). But see, e.g., 
Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 970-71 (pointing out 
the flaws with the money bail system and its ineffectiveness in deterring flight and 
accommodating the presumption of innocence). 
422 See Lester, supranote 29, at 3. 
423 Trujillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801 (Ark. 2016). 
424 State v. Gutierrez, 140 P.3d 1106 (2006). 
425 See id. at 161. 
426 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1331 (indicating that the 1984 Bail Reform 
Act, at least in form, reaffirmed that pretrial release was to continue to be the 
norm).
427 Trujillo, 483 S.W.3d at 802. 
428 Gutierrez,140 P.3d at 1107. 
429 See id. at 1107; Trujillo, 483 S.W.3d at 802. 
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Vols. 36-37 
ple, cases like Fragosov. Fe[[,43 1 State v. Briggs,432 and Saundersv. 
Hornecker433 dealt with nonviolent defendants unable to post cash-
only bail. 434 These courts all held that cash-only bail was constitu-
tional notwithstanding the defendants' low-level offenses.435 While 
protecting the community against violent offenders may provide an 
adequate justification for cash-only bail, protecting the community 
from indigent, nonviolent offenders fails to justify cash-only bail 
entirely.436 
The shortcomings of money and cash-only bail outweigh 
many of their benefits, as the failings of the current system and its 
effects on the indigent remain.437 Bail schedules have proven to be 
unworkable, 438 and focusing on the nature of the offense and the 
need to secure dangerous defendants' appearance at trial has lumped 
in indigent, nonviolent offenders in a financial-incentive system in 
which they do not belong. 439 Courts faced with cash-only bail chal-
lenges in the future should address the bigger issue of its unfairness 
430 See Appleman, supranote 12, at 1311. 
431 Fragoso v. Fell, 111 P.3d 1027 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
432 State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 2003). 
33Saunders v. Homecker, 344 P.3d 771 (Wyo. 2015). 
131 See Fragoso, 111 P.3d at 1029 (charging defendant as a co-conspirator to sell 
marijuana); Briggs,666 N.W.2d at 574-75 (charging defendant with prostitution); 
Saunders, 344 P.3d at 774 (charging two of three defendants with nonviolent 
offenses-interference with a police officer and failure to maintain liability cover-
age-while the third defendant was charged with aggravated assault). 
135 See cases cited supraat 435. 
436 See Lester, supranote 31, at 25 ("Unless the defendant threatened to potential 
witnesses, it is improper for the court to look at anything beyond the defendant's 
finances in setting bail."). 
137 See Tmjillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Ark. 2016) (Brill, C.J., dissenting) 
("[C]ash-only bail has drawbacks [as i]t may have an unfair, even disparate 
impact, upon lower-income defendants without resources [and] ...may be used 
punitively.").
438 See supranotes 179-181 and accompanying text (pointing out the flaws associ-
ated withjudges' use of bail schedules on criminal defendants). 
139 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1336 (criticizing the 1984 Bail Reform Act's 
emphasis on a defendants' future dangerousness in setting bail questioning state's 
compliance with the Act despite its deficiencies). 
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to many pretrial defendants,44 ° and consider the alternatives to 
money bail.441 
C. Proceed with Caution: Alternatives to Cash-Only 
Bail 
Alternatives are available for judges to use to counteract the 
adverse effects of cash-only bail on the indigent.442 Electronic 
monitoring, for example, allows defendants to live and work in their 
communities, thereby promoting defendants' liberty interests while 
costing less than pretrial incarceration.443 In addition, recognizance 
bonds provide a cash-free alternative for those low-risk, low-income 
defendants who would otherwise await trial from a jail cell or plead 
guilty to avoid further incarceration.444 These alternatives consider 
the past successes of bail reform in America, but also look to 
technology to provide indigent defendants with an alternative to 
pretrial detention.445 States should still, however, proceed with 
caution in considering these alternatives, as they still pose problems 
and potential abuse.44 6 
1. Welcome to the New Age: Electronic 
Monitoring as an Alternative to Cash-
Only Bail and the Money Bail System 
States may utilize electronic monitoring to supervise 
defendants in the community before trial instead of imposing cash-
only bail to incarcerate them.447 Electronic monitoring is an effec-
tive alternative that furthers the accused's liberty interests before 
440 See Carlson, supra note 176, at 16 (noting that the money bail system "raises 
... questions about the fundamental fairness of a pretrial release system based 
upon money").
441 See supra Sections II.D.2-3; infra Section III.C. 
442 See infra Sections III.C. 1-2. 
113 See inJfa Section III.C. 1. 
...See infra Section III.C.2. 
115 See infra Sections III.C. 1-2 
446 See infra Sections III.C. 1-2. 
117 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1364-80. 
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conviction while also assuring the accused's presence at trial. 448 The 
costs of electronic monitoring are low, and, in comparison to 
detaining defendants before trial, electronic monitoring would cut 
spending almost in half 449 Moreover, these electronic monitoring 
devices allow defendants to work and continue to support their 
families in between arrest and trial, which is particularly important 
to low-income defendants, whose pretrial detention has a greater 
effect on their families.450 Offering electronic monitoring to indigent 
defendants to secure pretrial release would also help them better 
prepare their criminal cases and reduce the likelihood of convic-
tion.451 
The benefits to the defendants that stem from electronic 
monitoring are enormous.452 Defendants released on electronic devi-
ces are able to see their families and can continue to provide support 
for them by working and retaining their jobs.453 Their presence out 
in the community is critical for those too poor to post a cash bail, as 
defendants' families need them for financial and emotional sup-
port.454 Similarly, because electronic monitoring allows defendants 
to be out in the community and meet with their attorneys more 
freely, electronic monitoring may lead to better outcomes for 
448 See id at 1364 ("Increasingly advanced technologies are able to closely moni-
tor pretrial defendants' locations while granting them far greater freedom .... ). 
"9 See id. at 1373 (noting pretrial detention costs between $50 to $123 dollars per 
day and electronic monitoring costs between $5 to $25 per day).
450 See id. at 1356-57, 1363. 
451 See id. at 1356 ("The difficulty of preparing an adequate defense makes the 
likelihood of success at trial much lower for pretrial detainees than for those who 
have secured release."); see also Neil, supra note 9, at 13-14 (noting the impact 
money bail has on poor pretrial defendants in preparing adequate defenses and the 
increased likelihood of poor defendants to plead guilty to avoid further detention). 
452 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1364. 
153 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1362 ("Allowing indicted offenders out on 
bail with the help of electronic monitoring permits them to save their jobs, pay 
their bills, keep their homes and see their families."). 
151 See id. at 1319-20, 1362 (noting family members of a criminal defendant 
detained pretrial suffer "emotional and economic hardships"); Wiseman, supra 
note 15, at 1374; see also Neil, supra note 9, at 13-14 (noting the impact that 
pretrial incarceration has on poor defendants and their families due to the detainee 
being unable to work). 
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indigent defendants' criminal cases and less false convictions.455 
The obstacles that pretrial detention creates for defendants in pre-
paring an adequate defense dissipate when defendants are able to 
freely meet and discuss their cases with their attorneys out in the 
community rather than from jail.456 Further, electronic monitoring 
reinforces defendants' expectation of pretrial release by granting 
indigent pretrial detainees their freedom before conviction and 
preserving the presumption of innocence.457 
The most plausible argument against electronic monitoring 
is the reduced incentive to appear in court.458 Whereas those 
released on a cash bond have incentive to appear in court and recu-
perate their bail money, 459 defendants released on electronic moni-
toring devices have no collateral on the line to keep them from 
fleeing.46 ° Considering the fact that indigent pretrial defendants lack 
financial resources to post bail to begin with, electronic monitoring 
provides no additional incentive for indigent defendants to show up 
155 See Appleman, supranote 12, at 1320 (indicating that "[t]he mere possibility of 
pretrial imprisonment often compels defendants to plead guilty and give up their 
right to trial"); Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1354-56, 1364 (arguing that pretrial 
electronic monitoring in lieu of incarceration allows pretrial defendants-who 
often plead guilty to avoid further incarceration-more opportunities to consult 
with their attorneys).
456 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1364; see also Neil, supranote 9, at 13 (noting 
the hardships pretrial defendants face in trying to prepare an adequate defense to 
criminal charges while incarcerated, including the inability to "gather witnesses [] 
and other activities need to present a strong case due to limited phone use, obliga-
tions to work long shifts in jail programs, [and] placement in jails long distances 
away from their counsel"). 
157 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1364; see also Lester, supranote 31, at 8-14, 
50-53 (noting the role the presumption of innocence plays in the criminal justice 
system and how pretrial detention impacts defendants). 
458 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1368-72 (highlighting the concern that elec-
tronic monitoring will never completely eradicate defendants' urge to flee); see 
also Van De Veer, supra note 35, at 848-49, 876-77 (arguing in favor of cash-
only bail and the money bail system because of its effectiveness in ensuring defen-
dants appearance in court compared to nonfinancial bail conditions). 
159 See Van De Veer, supranote 35, at 876-77. 
460 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1371 ("No matter how ingenious the technol-
ogy, it is likely that highly motivated defendants will find a way to defeat it."). 
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to court. 4 6 1 Thus, opponents of electronic monitoring see electronic 
monitoring not as an alternative, but as a waste of judicial 
462 
resources. 
However, while electronic monitoring may not completely 
eradicate a defendant's desire to flee, defendants who abscond from 
an electronic monitoring device will be in no worse position than if 
they received a secured bond.463 Judges typically either impose a 
secured bond or incarcerated defendants for absconding from their 
electronic monitoring devices.464 Therefore, pretrial release via elec-
tronic monitoring still gives defendants incentive to appear in 
court..465 This incentive to appear in court when released via electro-
nic monitoring is at least as effective as cash-only bail in ensuring a 
defendant's appearance in court.466 
The effectiveness of electronic monitoring in the pretrial 
context continues to give courts pause, however, because electronic 
monitoring is typically used during post-conviction proceedings, not 
during pretrial.467 Many jurisdictions have not adopted electronic 
monitoring programs because the statistics on electronic monitor-
ing's effectiveness in the pretrial phase are inconclusive. 468 As a 
result, money bail has remained judges' preferred option for pretrial 
release. 469 However, electronic monitoring still addresses the over-
461 See id. at 1385 (pointing out that the lack of financial resources reduces defen-
dants' incentive to appear in court).
462 See Van De Veer, supra note 35, at 864 n.82, 876-77 (noting the waste of 
judicial resources when defendants fail to appear in court and the incentive to 
appear that cash-only bail provides). 
463 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1371-72 (noting that judges may impose sanc-
tions and penalties on defendants released on electronic monitoring who either fail 
to appear in court or tamper with their devices).
464 See id. 
465 See id. 
466 See id.at 1372 (" [Electronic monitoring] has the potential to effectively replace 
unmeetable monetary requirements for non-dangerousness defendants.").
467 See id. at 1368-69. 
468 See id. 
469 See Neil, supranote 9, at 17 ("[A]s many jurisdictions do not have ... pretrial 
monitoring programs in place, judicial officers continue to rely on money bail as a 
release option."); see also Wice, supranote 48, at 10 (noting judges impose cash 
bail most frequently). 
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arching problem that the money bail system has created-that is, the 
overwhelming pretrial incarceration of poor, nonviolent defen-
dants. 470 Thus, judges in these jurisdictions should experiment with 
electronic monitoring in the pretrial context, particularly on nonvio-
lent, low-level offenders, as this alternative to money bail signifi-
cantly reduces the cost of pretrial release.471 While electronic moni-
toring has its own costs associated with it, this alternative cuts 
communities' costs considerably, as incarcerating defendants pre-
trial costs more than supervising them out in the community elec-
tronically.472 
Ultimately, while further inquiry is needed in determining 
electronic monitoring's pretrial effectiveness, electronic monitoring 
provides a feasible solution to money bail.473 Electronic monitoring 
is a substantial improvement over incarceration, as this alternative 
furthers defendants' liberty interests and decreases the costs to the 
criminal justice system overall.474 Thus, courts should consider 
using electronic monitoring in those instances where cash-only bail 
and money bail would fail to serve the interests of defendants, the 
courts, or the community.475 
470 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1372 (arguing that electronic monitoring may 
eliminate the pretrial detention of the poor).
471 See id. 
472 See id. at 1372 (noting that electronic monitoring programs can "generate signi-
ficant savings if used in place of pretrial detention"); see also Appleman, supra 
note 12, at 1362 (arguing that electronic monitoring programs save taxpayers more 
money than imprisoning indicted offenders). 
173See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1378 ("[W]hile future proposed uses of moni-
toring technology should be carefully scrutinized, this necessarily somewhat vague 
threat should not prevent its use to help the very real people currently in jail."). 
171 See id. at 1372, 1380 ("[E]lectronic monitoring is a major improvement over 
imprisonment, [and] the gap between rich and poor will be narrowed significantly 
by using [electronic monitoring] in place of imprisonment for failure to post 
bond."); see alsoAppleman, supranote 12, at 1362. 
175 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1374 (arguing that electronic monitoring "can 
be at least as cheap and effective as money bail"); see also Appleman, supranote 
12, at 1304, 1362 (advocating for the increased use of electronic monitoring in bail 
surveillance to combat prison overcrowding and help pretrial detainees obtain 
pretrial release). 
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2. Recognizance over Money: Release on 
Recognizance as an Alternative to Cash-
Only Bail and the Money Bail System 
Releasing low-income defendants accused of nonviolent, 
low-level offenses on their own recognizance achieves the overall 
goals of bail without infringing on defendants' liberty interests in 
the way that money bail infringes on defendants' liberty interests.476 
The use of risk assessments and individualized bail proceedings-
including an inquiry into defendants' financial capacity-will help 
judges determine which defendants require a secured bond and 
which could be released on their own recognizance.477 Like the 
Manhattan Bail Project, in which less than 1%of pretrial defendants 
released on their own recognizance failed to appear for trial, 478 
courts could revive the same or similar scheme and seek recommen-
dations for those likely to appear under their own recognizance. 
479 
The Project's success lead the way for nonfinancial conditions and 
pretrial release to become the norm. 480 Therefore, trial courts should 
consider recognizance bonds as well as the past success of unse-
cured releases when setting bail.481 
With no security or collateral offered, however, recogni-
zance bonds are arguably the least effective nonfinancial alternative 
to money bail, as it fails to incentivize even misdemeanor defen-
dants to appear in court.482 Further, without collateral or incentive, 
476 See Neil, supranote 9, at 31. 
177 See id. at 27-31 (noting that those with higher risk assessments do not receive 
recognizance bonds); see also Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supranote 
124, at 973-77 (arguing against the use of money bail and for personalized 
considerations in setting bail). 
478 See Schnacke, supra note 13, at 9 (noting the success of the Manhattan Bail 
Projects success in securing pretrial defendants' appearance in court).
179 See Neil, supra note 9, at 31, 43 (noting many people can be released on their 
own recognizance and that the use of risk assessments can help judges make 
informed bail decisions). 
480 See Carbone, supranote 56, at 553. 
481 See Neil, supranote 9, at 31. 
482 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1363 (noting the lack of effectiveness recogni-
zance bonds have on securing defendants' presence at trial). 
2017-2019 Cash Rules Everything 
those released on their own recognizance may pose a threat to the 
community, which justifies judges imposing money or cash-only 
bail to ensure both their compliance with the law and future appear-
ance in court.483 However, while felony defendants released on their 
own recognizance have a tendency to flee,484 many pretrial detain-
ees are accused of nonviolent, misdemeanor offenses.485 This 
indicates that recognizance bonds may be most effective to the 
group that would benefit most from their use-indigent, nonviolent 
pretrial defendants accused of low-level misdemeanors. 4
86 
Also, natural deterrents-such as family and communal ties, 
employment, or incarceration for absconding or committing new 
crimes-provide defendants with the same incentive to be law-
abiding and appear in court as if they were released on a cash 
bond.487 While an indigent defendant's lack of financial resources 
may make the defendant more of a flight risk,488 these natural deter-
rents offset an indigent defendant's increased likelihood to flee on a 
recognizance bond.489 Implementing notification systems reminding 
defendants of their court dates, times, and locations may also help 
483 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1330 (finding the safety of the community as 
a factor often considered by judges when setting bail); see also Hegreness, supra 
note 70, at 962 (indicating that states followed the 1984 Bail Reform Act, making 
it lawful to deny bail to persons the court believe pose a danger to the community). 
484 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1361 n.84 (describing one study that found 
roughly half of felony defendants who failed to appear in court were released on 
their own recognizance). 
485 See id. at 1346; see also Neil, supra note 9, at 18 (noting the number of non-
violent offenders detained pretrial); see generallyNeyfakh, supra note 349 (high-
lighting the injustice cash bail has on indigent defendants accused of low-level, 
misdemeanor crimes). 
486 See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1311 (noting the vast majority of offenders 
unable to obtain pretrial release are arrested for low-level, nonviolent offenses). 
487 See Bail:An Ancient PracticeReexamined,supra note 124, at 973 (noting that 
natural deterrents like employment and personal relationships provide defendants 
with incentive not to flee, such that preconditioning pretrial release on financial 
status is unnecessary). 
488 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1385 (pointing out that indigent defendants' 
lack of resources the same lack of financial resources that prevents them from 
obtaining pretrial release also makes these defendants more likely to flee).
489 See Bail:An Ancient PracticeReexamined,supranote 124, at 973. 
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reduce the number of court absences, as many missed court appear-
ances result from extraneous factors in defendants' lives, not from 
defendants fleeing before trial. 490 Further, judges should not be dis-
tracted by political motives or communal pressures to be "tough on 
crime. ' ,49 1 Because these outside pressures have caused many of the 
problems that are prevalent in today's criminal justice system,492 
judges should focus on the individual defendant when setting bail, 
not conform to public or political pressures by setting high bail 
amounts for those who cannot reach them.493 
Ultimately, alternatives to cash-only bail and the money bail 
system must be considered to eliminate the costs and consequences 
of detaining indigent defendants pretrial.494 The practice of setting 
high cash bails that defendants cannot afford should be abandoned 
and courts should use the excessive bail clause and the sufficient 
sureties' clause as a means of allowing defendants the opportunity to 
post an attainable bail.495 Also, future courts confronted with the 
constitutionality of cash-only bail should recognize its effect on the 
indigent instead of focusing exclusively on dangerousness or malle-
able interpretative tools. 496 Trial courts deciding whether to impose 
cash-only bail should (1) adhere to all of the factors in setting bail; 
490 See Neil, supra note 9, at 33-35 (advocating for the use of notification systems 
to offset the number of defendants failing to appear in court due to illness, work, 
confusion, or forgetfulness).
491 See Wice, supra note 48, at 15, 25 (indicating that newspapers and public 
opinion may exert outside pressures on judges, causing them to be more cautious 
in granting pretrial release).
492 See supra Section I.C.3 (describing the public concern over increased crime 
rates in the 1970s and 80s that lead to President Nixon's "war on crime' and the 
1984 Bail Reform Act). 
193 See Lester, supra note 31, at 44, 54 (pointing out that fear of political backlash 
may cause judges to lean towards incarceration instead of release, but arguing for 
courts to "protect themselves from emotional knee-jerk reactions," "eliminat[e] 
extraneous considerations," and "give all defendants the due process they are 
required by the Constitution"). 
'9' See Bail: An Ancient PracticeReexamined, supra note 124, at 973 ("The 
assumption that pretrial release must, in all cases, be conditioned on the posting of 
financial security should be discarded."). 
195 See supra Section I.A. 
496 See supra Section III.B. 
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(2) carefully consider a defendant's danger to the community; and, 
(3) when appropriate, use nonfinancial conditions and alternatives 
for the defendant's pretrial release.497 
CONCLUSION 
The overwhelming number of indigent criminal defendants 
that are detained before trial-only because these defendants are too 
poor to post bail-has demonstrated the need for reform. 498 The 
current bail system is predicated on courts' needs to ensure defen-
dants' future appearance in court, while the system focuses almost 
exclusively on defendants' potential danger to the community rather 
than defendants' liberty interests. 499 The most recent judicial tool 
judges use to secure defendants' appearance in court is cash-only 
bail. 50 0 States are split as to whether cash-only bail violates the 
accused's constitutional right to be bailable by sufficient sureties.50 1 
Ultimately, there are effective, efficient, and more cost-friendly 
solutions to the current bail system that are readily available for 
courts and legislatures to implement.50 2 These alternatives operate to 
secure defendants' pretrial release and protect defendants' interest in 
freedom before conviction.50 3 For "[i]n our society liberty is the 
'5° norm, 4 and ifcourts can deny a person their freedom by imposing 
197 See supra Sections III.B-C. 
498 See Wiseman, supra note 15, at 1403 ("At any given time, thousands of 
criminal defendants around the country are imprisoned to ensure their presence at 
trial despite being eligible for release, simply because they lack the financial 
resources to make bail."). 
'99See supraPart I. 
500 See supraPart II. 
501 See supra Section II.C. 
502 See Wiseman, supranote 15, at 1403 ("In the absence of judicial action, thous-
ands of criminal defendants will continue to be detained-and suffer all of the 
deleterious effects of detention-long after available technology would allow the 
government to achieve its goals at lower financial and human cost."); see also 
supraSection III.C. 
503 See supra Sections II.D.2; Section III.C. 
504 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
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cash-only bail, then "the presumption of innocence, secured only 
after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning. 50 5 
505 Stackv. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). 
